General Taylor's force was too weak to warrant the hope that he could successfully impede the march of Bank's column. After the latter reached Alexandria Taylor transferred part of his command to the river below Alexandria, and with unparalleled audacity and great ability so operated on the enemy's gun-boats and transports as to compel him, with a force quadruple his own, to abandon that important position.

A temporary rise in Red River enabled Admiral Porter to get his fleet over the Falls. Had he delayed but one week longer our whole infantry would have been with Taylor.

Some idea may be formed of the character of our operations when it is stated that Walker's division, from the opening of the campaign at Simsport to the time of its arrival at Alexandria, a period of about two months, marched 700 miles and fought three pitched battles.

Information having been received that A. J. Smith's command was proceeding up the Mississippi River, I threw Marmaduke across from Camden to dispute its progress. He attacked the fleet, disabled or destroyed three of its boats, compelled it to halt and land its infantry, which he engaged for several hours.

Here ends a campaign in which, with a force of 25,000 men, all told, in the entire department, I drove back whence they came armies 60,000 strong, supported by an enormous fleet, inflicting immense loss in both men and material. It is not difficult to understand that at its close my forces required rest and reorganization.

Banks', or rather Canby's, army remained for some time at Morganza, a strongly fortified position and occupied at this time by a large force. The Atchafalaya still across that stream.

You say that I should have followed the movements of the enemy. This was simply impossible. The Nineteenth Army Corps was sent to New York or Washington. The portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, were withdrawn to Memphis, delayed, as I have said, for a few days by Marmaduke, while the Thirteenth corps was dissolved by order of Mr. Lincoln, thus leaving in Louisiana, so far as we could ascertain, the re-enlisted men of the Thirteenth Corps and the Corps D'Afrique.

I should have mentioned that by a captured dispatch it was ascertained that the command of A. J. Smith on the 5th of April orders to immediately join Sherman at Vicksburg. The operations of Taylor on Red River and Marmaduke on the Mississippi prevented Smith from executing this movement until the middle of June, or for a period of more than sixty days.

I had not sufficient reason to believe that there remained a large force disposable for an attack on Mobile. How could I employ my command so as to attract a large force from either Sherman or Grant, or prevent a movement on Mobile? First, no demonstration could be made on New Orleans because of the Mississippi River. Any operations in the La Fourche country would necessarily be hazardous with the enemy at Morganza; would have been barren of military results; would have ravaged a country from which we should have been obliged to withdraw whenever the water rose.

In the second place, if I had seized a point on the Mississippi River with a view of causing the enemy to send a large force to dislodge me the attempt would have failed unless I had had guns sufficiently heavy to contend with iron-clads. Had I had these my entire army would probably have been a repetition of the Vicksburg and Port Hudson affairs.

There remained a third plan, viz, to push a large cavalry force into Missouri and support the movement by occupying my infantry in operations against Steele. Should he weaken himself to defend Saint Louis I might possibly take his works at Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and Devall's Bluff, and recover the State of Arkansas. If he proved too strong for me I would be at hand to help Price extricate himself in case of failure or disaster. This plan I was putting in execution, and had it not been for the telegrams of Generals Bragg and Lee, herewith inclosed, my infantry would have been now in the Arkansas Valley and Price would have been entering Missouri.

I have written thus at length in advance of my report, delayed by being unable to ge the reports of my subordinate commanders, because I learn that my policy and plans have been much discussed at Richmond, and that it has been charged that but for my errors much more important results would have been achieved. In this connection I have only to remark that I have honestly done what appeared to me to be right and proper. I claim that my combinations have resulted in great successes, and beg to doubt whether more could have been accomplished under a different system of operations.

Certain it is that my heart overflowed with thankfulness when I realized the fact that the valor and good conduct of the officers and men of my command had enabled me to oppose and overcome the vast armies moving against me.