during the summer, and our train of Government wagons required to maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this and as far as possible save the scanty agriculture of the country from devastation it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla. Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to abandon to loyal people of those districts and their property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains while moving them, capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail. Generals Sanborn and McNeil were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains and public property of their districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the best possible state of defense, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted force to watch the enemy's motions and report the earliest indications of the direction of the coming storm. General Brown was ordered to concentrate all troops from the west of the Central District at Sedalia, to notify the citizen guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture. On the 24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington, with 5,000 men and four pieces of artillery. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate the troops in the southern part of his district at pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau, and to verify the accuracy of this report, which proved true. On the 26th General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on the Iron Mountain Railroad "as far toward Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainly that his position would not be turned," and the enemy get between him and Saint Louis. On the day before Sanborn had orders to move with all his mounted force to Rolla, it having become evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point. The safety of Saint Louis was vital to us. I therefore telegraphed Brigadier General H. S. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who promised me assistance from some regiments of returning 100-days' volunteers, who, though they had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defense of the city. The enrolled militia of Saint Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out and the citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in Southeastern Missouri, and to that and to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the current rumors of the advance of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held his position until the 27th, when he sustained a terrific assault in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by hills within cannon-range, which he held with about 1,000 men, one-half raw troops, establishing beyond question the presence of all Price's command in that quarter. He gloriously repulsed, killing and wounding some 1,500 of the enemy, and lost only 28 killed and 56 wounded, as appears from his report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on Shelby advanced on Potosi, and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto. Previous to and pending these events the guerrilla warfare in North Missouri had been raging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents, amnesty oath-takers, recruits, sympathizers, O. A. K.'s, and traitors of every hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guer-