opened fire. I ordered the line to retire, the enemy advancing but a short distance as it withdrew. The line was ordered to advance again, and moved forward to within short musket-range of the enemy's main line. A dispatch from Colonel Eppstein, on the Georgetown road, announced that no portion of the rebel army had moved west, and I withdrew my lines to the south side of the Petit Saline. In the affair of this day my loss was 1 man killed and - wounded. The enemy's loss is known to have been 15 killed, and 28 so severely wounded that they could not be moved, and a large number were wounded and taken along with the army. Several officers, one a colonel, were reported among the rebel wounded. My command had been out of rations for thirty-six hours, the men had become much exhausted, and I could not learn of any train on the way to me. I determined to move toward California in the morning, until I should meet a subsistence train, and return immediately upon procuring supplies. Four days' rations were procured and issued at California, and the command moved back to its position in front of Boonville by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 13th of October. Colonel Catherwood's brigade of veteran troops, 1,500 strong, reported to me at California and held the advance in this day's march. A reconnaissance made by a detachment of the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, under Captain Turley, developed he fact that the enemy had left Boonville on the morning of the 13th and moved westerly, crossing the La Mine River at Dug Ford and Scott's Ford. My apprehension was that the enemy would move by rapid marches to Lexington, and into Kansas, and thereby prevent the organization and concentration of the troops of that department on the border against him, and at the same time place so great a distance between his army and the infantry and cavalry of this department, then moving to the front in support of my command, that it would be impossible for them to join me if I should follow him, and thereby avoid a battle with the large number of troops then being marshaled for that purpose or with any command larger than my own. Hence all my movements after the enemy left Boonville were made with the view of holding the enemy in or near Saline County until the Kansas troops were organized and on the border, and Winslow's brigade of cavalry and General A. J. Smith's command of infantry and artillery should be within striking distance. I therefore moved my command, with the exception of a small force under Captain Turley, which was ordered to follow the enemy's trail by Nebo Church, through Georgetown up the Georgetown and Lexington road to Cook's Store, arriving at this point at 3 p. m. on the 15th day of October, with the view of resisting the advance of the enemy, and attacking his flanks if he should advance immediately.

After the first day's march from Boonville the enemy moved slowly, portions of his command halting a short time near Marshall, Arrow Rock, and Waverly. Detachments from my command reconnoitered the position and movements of the enemy daily. On the 17th day of October some movements were reported that indicated a design on the part of the enemy to move southeast through marshall, and his advance not having appeared at Dover I moved south to the Blackwater to be in a better position to strike the enemy if he should move in that direction. Subsistence supplies had also been exhausted for two days, and it was absolutely necessary to get a train from Sedalia. Immediately upon my command moving south to the Blackwater the enemy commenced moving west rapidly. Subsistence was obtained and issued on the 19th day of October, and on this day I received the first dispatch from General