marauders, which has since increased to about 500, and Colonel Brooks with 300, since increased to nearly 1,200 men. Brooks was appointed by magruder to take charge of this district and to organize all the predatory bands into a cavalry brigade, to be commanded by himself. These bands during the summer have given Union citizens great annoyance, constantly plundering and driving them from their homes, until the rebel rule int he surrounding country has been for a time almost complete. Until lately they have been unable to effect anything against the troops here more than to annoy small foraging parties, mail-carriers, and telegraph repairers. The duties devolving upon my command (eleven companies of cavalry), which was the only one in a country 110 miles broad and 250 miles long, have been so arduous that with from 100 to 300 horses (the greatest number at any one time on hand during the summer and autumn) it has been impossible to carry mails to Cassville and Van Buren, fifty-five miles each way, to keep the telegraph in repair, forage for the post, escort supply trains, and at the same time do the amount of scouting necessary to keep the country rid of the rowing bands of the enemy. Since the commencement of Price's raid these desperadoes had become more bold and seriously threatened for some time the post of Fayetteville and the government supply trains. On the 20th of October, while I was passing with a train through Benton County from Cassville, Mo., with an escort of 170 men, I met and attacked 600 men under Buck Brown, who was awaiting my approach. The engagement lasted for over two hours, when the rebels were routed in confusion, with a loss of several killed and wounded. Before my arrival I learned that Brooks, with 800 men, was lying in ambush at Fitzgerald Mountain, and at midnight passed around his camp, leaving it five mile son my left, and arrived in safety with my train at 1 p. m. on the 25th. Brooks then invested the town of Fayetteville with his forces, expecting thereby to starve the garrison into submission, but in this he was deceived. By reducing my issues to seven ounces of bread per day I found that my stores would hold out for twenty days and felt assured that where that was exhausted assistance would come. My only trouble was forage. It was impossible to send out my train without the most imminent danger of its capture. I therefore procured gunny-sacks for each teamster and mounted man, and watching the safest opportunities sent out my men as often as possible under an experienced officer.

On the 27th Captain D. C. Hopkins, commanding forage detachment, after procuring his supplies, was attacked by 500 men under Brown and fought his way into camp for five miles, occupying four hours in falling back, which he did in good order, without loss, though narrowly escaping, being attacked in his rear by 800 men under Brooks, who had gone to Brown's assistance. At sunrise October 28 Brooks occupied East Mountain and commenced an attack on my outworks. I immediately detached Captain D. C. Hopkins and Captain E. B. Harrison, First Arkansas Cavalry, with a dismounted force, who charged up the side of the mountain in face of deadly fire from the enemy, and at the third attempt drove him from the summit, capturing his dead and wounded, together with quite an amount of forage and some small-arms. At 10 a. m. Brown attacked the west side of the works, but was repulsed with loss in about two hours; the whole engagement lasted from sunrise until noon, when the enemy retreated. Brooks' loss on est was, by admission of the enemy, 12 killed and about 25 wounded, several mortally. Brown's loss on the west 11 killed and wounded. My own 2 mortally, 1 severely, and 4 slightly wounded. The enemy still hovered about,