sance toward Fredericktown, and a small scouting party under Captain Powers to cross the roads leading from the south to that place, and learn of the loyal people on them as much as possible as to the force of the enemy. Both commands met Price's advance in Arcadia Valley, near Shut-in Gap, and were forced back into the town of Ironton, where, with Captain Dinger's company, Forty-seventh Missouri, then on duty there, they made a stand. I re-enforced them with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa, Captain Campbell commanding and a section of Montgomery's battery, Lieutenant Simonton commanding, and all my available cavalry, placing the whole under command of Major Wilson, with orders to drive the enemy, if possible, through Shut-in Gap. He drove them to the gap, but was unable to hold them there, and was being forced back gradually when night and a rain-storm suspended the engagement. By midnight it was evident that the enemy were in strong force, as their column could be heard coming into the valley in steady procession, and their encampment grew extensive. We still did not know positively that Price's main army was there, though all our information was decidedly to that effect. But the advantages of delaying the enemy two or three days in his march northward and of making a stubborn fight before retreating were so great, even though the defense should be unsuccessful and much of the garrison be lost, that I resolved to stand fast and take the chances. I immediately forwarded up the railroad all the quartermaster and commissary stores not needed in the fort, and all the rolling-stock, and started the quartermaster's wagons empty. Details were set at work constructing in the fort six platformed barbettes for the field artillery, four pieces of which were taken into it. Lieutenant David Murphy, Forty-seventh Missouri Volunteers, a most gallant officer and experienced artillerist, was assigned to duty on my staff as aide-de-camp and given general control of the artillery. Major-General Smith, whose immediate command was at De Soto and Mineral Point was kept fully advised by telegraph of my information, movements and purpose, until 11 o'clock Tuesday forenoon, when the line went down.

At daylight Tuesday the enemy forced Wilson back through Arcadia Valley tot he gap between Shepherd's Mountain and Pilot Knob. While they were trying to force the gap I ordered the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa to take position on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain and ordered Wilson to fall back with his cavalry along the side of Pilot Knob, thus commanding the gap from both sides and opening a clear range from the fort. Wilson soon sent me word that the enemy were displaying a flag of truce. I knew it was a trick to effect a safe passage of the gap while parleying about a surrender, and therefore ordered him to renew the fight at once. A long and obstinate struggle followed in which the enemy lost considerably in an unsuccessful effort to pass the defile. During an hour of comparative quiet which followed they threw a force around Shepherd's Mountain and approached from the west, but that approach was too greatly exposed and they were driven from it by our artillery, aided by two companies of skirmishers. An hour more and my troops were summarily ejected from the points commanding the gap the enemy following them along the hill-sides in strong force. When they had well advanced we opened on them with all our guns and drove them back in disorder and with heavy loss. We retook the gap, were again forced from it, and again with artillery drove them from the hill-sides. They got two pieces in position on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain commanding a part of the side of Pilot Knob, which being equally commanded from the fort became neutral ground.