of country. Following up that valley through Pocahontas, he entered Missouri near the southeast corner, and moved north through the Iron Mountain defiles, meeting no resistance until he reached the vicinity of Pilot Knob, Mo. Here, on the 28th [27th] of September, he met a gallant resistance by General Ewing, who repulsed his attack on the fort at Pilot Knob, but subsequently evacuated and fell back, allowing Price to move on to Franklin and Washington, striking the Missouri River at the latter place. This intelligence of the progress of the enemy came to me through Major-General Rosecrans, commander of the Department of the Missouri, General Thayer, who commander at Fort Smith, Ark, and also from scouts sent out by Colonel Blair, who commanded at Fort Scott, keeping me fully informed. During the period to which I have referred I was annoyed by a rebel approach under General Gano, who came within seventy miles of my southern line with a large force and captured a large train at Cabin Creek belonging to General Steele's department. The Indians on the plains also continued to occupy my troops on the overland routes and alarm the people throughout the Territories and western portion of Kansas. As the enemy at Washington, on the Missouri, had reached the turning point of his northern movement (crossing the Missouri not being rational), leaving most of our Federal forces in his rear and right flank, his movement westward toward my department seemed inevitable. General Rosecrans was re-enforced by troops under General Mower, General Smith, and 100-days' regiments from Illinois, but all these being on the other side of Price the greater the number the more certain and expeditious would be the movement toward my department. The crisis as to the direction of the enemy's movement occurred about the 2nd of October, and I telegraphed Colonel Ford, who occupied the district of Kansas City (and therefore my front, in view of the approach of the enemy), to send forward scouts and keep in constant intercourse with General Brown, whose district extended down the Missouri, on the south side of the Missouri River. On the same day I was informed that General Fisk had moved from the north side with a considerable force, to save Jefferson City from the enemy. On the 4th I received the following dispatch from General Brown:

JEFFERSON CITY, October 4, 1864 -- 2.50 p. m.

Major-General CURTIS:

The rebels are on the road between me and Saint Louis, and have cut off all communications. They attacked Hermann last evening and had three pieces of artillery. They have captured railroad train and three locomotives. It is said they also captured four steam ferry-boats. If you support me it must be by direct movement down the river as quickly as possible. Am doing all I can to be ready to defend the place, but the situation is bad. I was infantry and artillery. The rebels have a large force. The appearances are that enemy are moving up the river.

E. B. BROWN,

Brigadier-General.

At 3.55 p. m. he added that General Fisk's command are moving to my support. When he arrives I shall have 6,000 men and eight small pieces of artillery. I telegraphed this intelligence through various routes to General Rosecrans, but lines being down, could get no intelligence through. I took the liberty to suggest to General Brown that

Price should be checked at the Gasconade River. Bridges and boats on the Gasconade and Osage should be beyond all possible use to him. Destroying an eastern span of railroad bridge may be necessary. River too low, and boats too scarce for my movements. Rains will raise streams and Price must be captured. Do not allow your force to be capture. If too small better fall back, but stand as long as you can safely.