BATTLE OF LITTLE BLUE.

It was not my intention to give battle on the Little Blue, as will be seen by my letter of instructions to General Blunt, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE BORDER,
Independence, October 20, 1864.

General BLUNT,

In the Field:

GENERAL: I have no time to explain. Your troops must take position here where dry corn and provisions are arranged. The militia will not go forward and the Big Blue must be our main line for battle. We must not break down our best regiments, Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth, and Ford's must have some rest. Leave two howitzers and, say, 400 men at the Little Blue, and come back yourself with the remainder. Probably Moonlight had better be left in command of that point, not to fight a battle, but to delay the rebel approach, and fall back to our main force. I our battle-ground where we can have united councils as well as a strong position. This we are securing at Big Blue end elsewhere. The blow you gave the enemy is doing good in the rear. It is crushing some of the silly rumors that had well-night ruined my prospects of a successful defense.

Truly, yours,

S. R. CURTIS,

Major-General.

This was in response to General Blunt's dispatch dated "nine miles east of Independence, 8 a. m. October 20," in which he suggested other arrangements. General Rosecrans was fully informed and responded from Sedalia, 5.40 a. m. the 20th, saying:

Your dispatch of 4.30 received. I will push my forces on Lexington with all possible speed.

About 9 o'clock in the morning of the 21st I received intelligence that the enemy had attacked Colonel Moonlight at the Little Blue, where he was resisting their passage of the stream, although by some accident he had failed to destroy the bridge. I immediately proceeded with my escort to reconnoiter the premises, giving permission rather than ordering Colonel Ford's regiment, McLain's battery, and a portion of the regular cavalry under General Blunt might accompany me to the front, expecting to meet Colonel Moonlight in retreat. But this gallant officer stood his ground until we arrived and developed most of the force I have named. I directed Captain McLain to form his battery behind the crest of the hill so as to fire over and against heavy artillery firing of the enemy that passed high over our heads, but did some damage to troops deploying in our rear. Colonel Jennison's brigade and that of Colonel Ford soon occupied advanced positions and made a desperate resistance to the rebel advance, which had by this time began to deploy on the west side of the stream. General Blunt and my staff were active in directing a proper disposition of forces. By this means we checked and drove back the enemy's advance, but as he soon began to outflank us on both sides of the road I directed the force to fall back, designating positions for the artillery tot make a stand at timbered country. Many incidents in the conflict are detailed by my subordinates and those of General Blunt. Major R. H. Hunt, chief of artillery, took direction of my escort and four howitzers, doing signal service in the hottest of the fight, and only fell back by my orders when I saw we were being outflanked.

The details of his report deserves repetition. He says:

By your direction I placed McLain's battery in position and opened fire on the enemy, with what result I cannot state. I also placed two mountain howitzers connected with your body guard in position in the open field, but finding it too much