approbation, as there are no other troops sufficient to carry out the purpose of the lieutenant-general commanding. Since my militia have left me your portion of the command has been much the greatest and I have expected your arrival to assume the responsibilities of the movement against Price.

S. R. CURTIS,

Major-General.

I also telegraphed you as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE BORDER,
Neosho, Mo., October 30, 1864-1 a. m.

Major-General HALLECK,

Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:

Your dispatch, informing me of the wishes of Lieutenant-General Grant, to pursue Price to the Arkansas River, is just received. I send couriers with orders to this effect directed to the several brigade commanders of the troops of General Rosecrans, who had abandoned the pursuit by his orders. I will proceed with my own force toward Cassville, hoping to concentrate sufficient troops at that point to resume the pursuit.

S. R. CURTIS,

Major-General.

Before leaving Neosho on the 30th I also sent the following more extend report, which was dispatched by telegraph from Fort Scott, November 1. These dispatches are set out in this report to make me properly responsible for my share of the influences that led to the action of the lieutenant-general and yourself:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF BORDER,
Neosho, Mo., October 30, 1864.

Major-General HALLECK,

Washington, D. C.:

I desire the lieutenant-general to understand that from the commencement of the effort in this campaign I have had to occupy a debatable position as to my authority over troops, while a necessity pressed me forward. The militia cavil about going across State lines; and General Rosecrans' commanders, except one or two, ever since we formed a junction, expressed a conviction that they had done enough, and urged with much truth their long march and general destitution as the reason for delay. I used argument, expostulation, and orders till we fought at Charlot, opposite Fort Scott. Here General Pleasonton, without consulting me, flanked off most of his force and insisted that further pursuit was needless. I did not know where General Rosecrans' headquarters were, for he had been shifting them, fifty or sixty miles in the rear, and matters required immediate action. I therefore informed General Pleasonton that I assumed the responsibilities and must exercise the prerogatives of rank and direct him to resume the pursuit. To this he yielded and ordered his brigade to join me. They were in full march when General Blunt overtook the enemy at Newtonia and General Sanborn's brigade came up in time to secure a victory where we had only been able to hold our own for two hours, with considerable loss on both sides. The pursuit was resumed, when the order of General Rosecrans came, directing his troops to their several district locations, and they immediately commenced to carry out that order. This left only me department volunteers, who had borne the brunt of the last battle and were sadly reduced in numbers, not exceeding 1,000 effective men. My militia had left me at Fort Scott, supposing very reasonably that the united regular volunteers were enough to pursue Price. I saw no alternative, and with mortification returned from the retreating foe. Both Generals Rosecrans and Pleasonton were a hundred miles in my rear and it seemed impossible to correct this mistake. I am sure they would not have withdrawn their troops if they had been present, both supposing I could not again overtake Price. I had fallen back twelve miles to this place, when I received your dispatch, informing me that "the lieutenant-general desires that Price should be pursued to the Arkansas," and I immediately issued orders announcing this to all the troops, directing them to return by the shortest lines to the pursuit. I still occupy a debatable position, and have telegraphed General Rosecrans my desire, that, as a large majority of the troops are his, he should come and assume the command. The necessity of pushing Price's force beyond the Arkansas is so obvious I have not hesitated to disregard department lines, and act only in view of results which involve the safety of our garrisons in front, and the future peace of the inhabitants of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas. I was not well when I started and have been eighteen days without changing my clothes, but I am now well and willing to do all in my power to execute the wishes of the lieutenant-general, and only fear that con-