About 1.30 the column took up the line of march again, and at 3 p. m. halted for camp. Finding that if I continued with General Rosecrans my chance of ever rejoining my own command was exceedingly poor I decided upon pushing on and letting General Rosecrans came up with his infantry in his own way. Calling my men together I started on. General Rosecrans was sitting on a log at the side of the road, and asked me where I was going. I told him my place was with my command, and I thought I would not be able to reach it if I remained with him. He jumped up from the stump or log and in a very angry manner said, "Go on, then." There I left him, nor saw nor heard of him afterward. Some five miles farther on my road south I saw coming from the northeast a column of cavalry approaching the road I was then on, moving south. Upon looking at them through my glass I saw a large white flag flying from a lance staff. We waited for them to come up, when I had a conversation with the officer in command. It proved to by a company of the Third Iowa Cavalry, under command of a first lieutenant, carrying a flag of truce, and from forty to fifty prisoners of war, captured at or near Lexington. The lieutenant informed me he carried orders from general Rosecrans to take these prisoners into the lines of Price. I informed him that General Rosecrans was only about five miles back, camped, at which he seemed much surprised, and dismounting his men and prisoners, rode back to see General Rosecrans and get further orders. I marched on, leaving the command and prisoners dismounted on the road. The circumstance at the time struck me as very strange that prisoners should be sent into Price's lines under a flag of truce upon the field of battle.

This, colonel, is a full and correct statement of affairs and conversations held with General Rosecrans. I could not fail to see plainly that a bitter feeling existed between General Rosecrans and his staff toward General Curtis. His actions were spoken of in a very sneering manner; that every move made by General Curtis was made wrong and in a "bungling manner," or, in the language of Colonel Du Bois, "beautifully muddled up." My first impression was (after ascertaining that General Rosecrans was hostile in feeling toward General Curtis) to leave General Rosecrans at once, but, I deemed it my duty to ascertain, as nearly as possible, what the precise difficulty was, so that if disaster should befall General Curtis through any lack of co-operation on the part of General Rosecrans I might, perhaps, be able in part to account for such lack. After mature deliberation, coupled with such information as I could glean from casual remarks from different officers connected apparently closely with General Rosecrans, it is my firm conviction that the plan of General Rosecrans was to have Price whip the few raw, undisciplined troops of General Curtis and then crush Price himself (which it strikes me he could have done at any time after Price had entered Missouri), carrying off the palm of victory himself at the fearful cost of sacrificing the whole Kansas frontier.

It is a fearful thing to accuse a man, hitherto honored and respected as Major-General Rosecrans has been and is now, of being a traitor to his flag; yet his lack of co-operation, his tardy pursuit, cast a black shadow upon all his former services, and true, loyal men will see only a desire on his part to hand the State of Missouri over to our enemy without a blow being struck for its defense. I was informed by an officer at Fort Scott that Major-General Smith, commanding the infantry force, had repeatedly urged upon General Pleasonton the necessity of attacking Price and bringing him to bay, so as to allow General Smith to get up with his infantry and artillery force and bring on a