Question. Was the failure to comply with this order reported to General Price? And, if so, state what measures, if any, he adopted to enforce its observance.

Answer. I reported the fact to Colonel Maclean, the assistant adjutant-general on General Price's staff, who stated that he would issued another order. I know not that it was issued.

Question. State whether or not the army was ever detained because of the engineer or pioneer troops being from the front of the army. If so, how long, and what occasioned their absence from the front?

Answer. Sometimes it was detained for an hour or two from this cause in Arkansas and Missouri; sometimes from mistakes of their own officers, mistaking a detachment to guard our flanks for the advance guard of the main army. The officer in command of engineer troops assigned by department headquarters was a confirmed cripple, and his physical incapacity to discharge the duties of his office occasioned some mismanagement of those troops. On one occasion, I think at the crossing of the Osage, where it was necessary to cut a roadway, the train was detained four or five hours by the absence of General Fagan's pioneers, whose captain reported to me as an excuse that they were eight miles behind by order of General Fagan.

Question. How long in all was the march of the army from Princeton to Fredericktown delayed because of the improper organization or management or disposition of the engineer and pioneer troops, and their want of proper implements?

Answer. About three days.

Cross-examined by Major General S. PRICE:

Question. State if Princeton was not the place of rendezvous for the army south of the Arkansas River.

Answer. It was.

Question. State if the army under my command was not detained in organizing it, arranging transportation, and the issuing of necessary supplies until a late hour on the day I reached Tulip.

Answer. It was.

Question. State, if you know, why the route by Dardanelle was taken instead of the route east of Pine Bluff.

Answer. First, because the route east of Pine Bluff furnished but a scant subsistence. The Saline River and Bayou Batholomew crossed on that route, both unfordable, the bottoms being very bad, and the country between the Saline and Arkansas Rivers on that route had been in a great measure exhausted of its supplies by our army and that of the enemy. Second, the great probability of having our crossing of the Arkansas River disturbed by the gun-boats of the enemy on that stream. Third, in the event of crossing of that stream safely we would have had to cross the White River either at Jacksonport or Batesville. Had we moved directly upon Batesville we should have marched twenty-five or thirty miles over a long prairie, a bog in the rainy season and a desert in the dry. In addition, we would have had to cross the high, rocky spurs of mountains, almost impracticable for loaded wagons, with the enemy in position on our left flank at Little Rock and Pine Bluff, within from twenty-five to thirty miles of our line of march; also on our right flank at Devall's Bluff. Fourth. Had we marched by Jacksonport, we could have found no better ford within twenty miles of the place as reported from previous reconnaissances. This route in distance is some sixty miles the shortest. The upper route was taken because, first, it could supply forage and subsistence; second, the road practicable, better bottoms of streams, not wide; third, it masked the real object of the campaign, indicating Fort Smith as the objective point and threatening Little Rock itself, and the passage of the Arkansas safe from disturbance by gun-boats, and a greater probability of finding the river fordable above than below Little Rock.

Question. Was it not necessary to raise the quartermaster's and commissary stores in the wagons as well as the ammunition at Dardanelle?

Answer. I did not observe that, but in some cases I observed that ordnance stores were raised.