it opened fire upon my lines. The enemy's lines were formed in a quarter circle covering my right and left flank, and the nearest estimate I could form of their numbers was between 2,000 and 2,500 and four or six pieces of artillery. (They numbered not less than 2,000 at the very lowest estimate and four to six pieces of artillery, some of them rifled guns.) The enemy formed in two lines with mounted men in the first line and dismounted in the rear line, a few paces in rear of the first. Two pieces of their artillery were posted in our immediate front an two pieces opposite that right flank, making a cross- fire on my line and the train. At the first charge of the enemy the teamsters and wagon- masters, with but very few exceptions, stampeded, taking with them one or more mules out of each wagon, leaving their trains and going in the direction of Fort Scott. This rendered it impossible to move any portion of the train. The enemy was held in check from 1 a. m. by about 400 of my men until 7.30 o'clock, when they advanced upon my line, planting their artillery within 100 yards of our position,and our forces were compelled to fall back in disorder,leaving the train, excepting a few wagons and an ambulance that immediately move back on the Fort Scott road across Cabin Creek. I encouraged the men to hold out until daylight, at which time I was in hopes Major Foreman, Third Indian Regiment, with six companies of Indians and two howitzers would arrive and attack the enemy in the rear. In order to move the train across the creek to a more remote position, I made every effort to rally the teamsters and wagon- masters, and while attempting to accomplish this the enemy swung around my right flank and took possession of the road in our rear, rendering all efforts to move the train useless. On seeing this, I collected all the scattered troops possible together and moved in the direction east of Cabin Creek, on Grand River, where I was in hopes of joining Major Foreman, and if possible retake a portion of the train. At daylight I sent a messenger to the commanding officer at Hudson's Crossing of the Neosho River to immediately join me with his entire force,and in doing so he would protect any parties or part of the train that might have fallen back in that direction. Finding it impossible to join Major Foreman, I sent a messenger to the commanding officer at Gibson informing him that the train had been captured, and I immediately marched for that place and arrived there on the morning of the 21st at 7 a. m.

I expected Major Foreman to join me on the morning of the attack, but I find he was not within forty- five miles of my position at the time the enemy moved upon me. The force sent under Colonel J. M. Williams I knew nothing of until my arrival at Gibson. I sent four messengers to Gibson, calling for re- enforcements, two of whom were cut of and captured, and consequently were not received by the commanding officer at the post, but every effort was made on his part to hurry up to my assistance all the force he could possibly spare. I was not apprised that the enemy had more than 1,200 to 1,500 men, and did not expect they had any artillery, until they opened it upon my line at 10 o'clock in the morning. The night previous to the attack it was my understanding that Major Foreman, with 300 Indians and two mountain howitzers, would camp within nine or ten miles of the post at Cabin Creek and move on to re- enforce me at daylight next morning. It is my opinion that the enemy did not get away with more than 75 or 100 wagons, including Government wagons, sutler wagons, and ambulances. The remainder were destroyed at Cabin Creek. Great credit is due the commanding officer at Gibson in forwarding re- enforcements, and also to all the officers and men under my command throughout the entire