Having received information from the prisoners that the train which was expected from Fort Scott- the capture of which was the principal object of the expedition- was looked for daily, I sent Major Vann, Second Cherokee Regiment, up the Fort Scott road four miles, with instructions to send forward a small party to ascertain whether or not the train was in our vicinity. He accordingly took charge ofthe party himself, nd after going but a short distance was fired into by the enemy's picket and narrowly escaped being killed. Thinking the train advancing, upon receiving this intelligence, I sent Lieutenant- Colonel Vann with his regiment to his assistance. This enemy, however, proved only a small re- enforcement going to the train and moved northward during the night. Everything remained quiet until morning. Early in the morning General Gano sent a party to burn the hay at the Hickey place, but they found it strongly protected by additional troops from Fort Gibson. Re- enforcements were sent and a brisk skirmish ensued, but they were unable to accomplish this object, and as time, which was now all- important to us, would be required, our troops were withdrawn and rejoined the command, which had been steadily moving northward. Encamped on Wolf Creek on the 17th. General Gano on the 18th proceeded with 400 Texas troops and two pieces of Howell's battery toward Cabin Creek, where we had learned the enemy had a garrison of 300 of the Second Indian Regiment (Cherokee Home Guards). About 3 o'clock I received a note from General Gano stating that the train was at Cabin Creek, and requesting me to move forward the whole command to that point as rapidly as possible. I joined him after midnight. After consultation we agreed to move on the enemy at once, who was aware of our approach, but entirely ignorant of our numbers. General Gano formed his line of battle on the right; my brigade formed on the left in the following order; First and Second Cherokee Regiments, Seminoles, Second and First Creek Regiments on the extreme left. Howell's battery took position in the center. The enemy had decidedly the advantage in position. Our men were formed on an elevated prairie that descended to the enemy's position on the creek. The moon, which shone very brightly, was in our rear. They thus had the double advantage of firing up hill with the moon and sky light. The enemy were strongly posted from the nature of the place under cover of the timber and bluff of the creek. They also had the residence of Joseph L. Martin on the road strongly fortified with heavy timbers set upright in the ground, that rendered them complete protection against small- arms. On the right of this they had placed long ricks of hay running parallel with each other and with the creek. The greater part ofthe train extended from the hay ricks up the creek on their right. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th the firing commenced by the enemy's skirmishers on their right. Soon the engagement became general along the line from right to left. During the night it was difficult to ascertain the enemy's exact position and strength, excepting from his fire. His line seemed to extend the length of ours. For a considerable length of time the firing was heavy and incessant. Our forces steadily advanced, driving the enemy to his cover. During the night our left drove the enemy from his position, leaving in our possession a part of his train, around which a guard was immediately thrown and most of the wagons moved to our rear.

Just at daybreak we supposed, from the noise in the enemy's camp, that he was crossing his train over the creek and moving it in the