HEADQUARTERS FORT LYON, COLO. TER.,
December 15, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report, in addition to my last report, that I rejoined Colonel Chivington's command sixty-five miles below this post on the morning of the 1st instant, having left this post at 11 p. m. the day previous; found him encamped on the bank of the river, where we remained until next day at 2 o'clock, when we learned through passengers on the Larned coach that a band of Indians was only fifteen miles below us. The command immediately broke camp, moved down seventeen miles and encamped at a point where the Indians had been encamped the previous night. Remained in camp until 11 p. m., when scouts brought in reports of Indians fifteen miles below. Broke camp at 2 a. m. of the 3rd instant and at daybreak came upon their old camp, which they had evidently left but a few hours previous, as was evidenced by their scattered lodge poles and cooking utensils, which were strewn along their trail for several miles. The Indians could not have been more than five miles in advance of us and were striking toward the head of Pawnee Fork, when we were ordered to return to the Arkansas River, where we lay encamped two days until our transportation came down, and were then ordered to return to Fort Lyon, where my command arrived on the 11th instant. Colonel Chivington passed the 10th instant en route for Denver, Colo. Ter., leaving Colonel Shoup in command. Colonel Shoup with his command passed on the 12th instant en route to Denver, leaving his sick and wounded in the hospital at this post. I am now of the same opinion that I was when reporting on the 25th November. I then thought that it would not be policy to fight these Indians who were suing for peace until there was a force sufficient to penetrate into their stronghold on the Smoky Hill and follow them up until they were completely humbled. I was attempting to keep those in this vicinity quiet until more troops could arrive, although I would not permit them to come within the post. Had fired upon several who had attempted it and had given strict instructions to the guard to permit no Indians to enter the post.

I am of the opinion now that the road and the settlements above us are in worse condition than before the arrival of Colonel Chivington's command. There was a force sufficient at the post to have totally annihilated the band that we attacked on the 29th at Sand Creek, but as I did not consider it policy for the present had delayed. I now regret exceedingly that Colonel Chivington's command could not have pursued the Indians farther. We were not to exceed from two to three days' march from the main hostile Indian camp, and, I think, with a force sufficient to have whipped them. The command must have had seventy wagons for 700 men. The weather fine for this season of the year; the proper time of year for an Indian campaign, and the moon in the right stage for forced night marches across the plains, and the Indians entirely without the knowledge of the increased force. I sincerely regret that so good an opportunity was lost to follow the Indians up. The Indians after they once commenced resisting us at Sand Creek fought with desperation. They evidently expected to be killed, and were resolved to do us all the injury possible before losing their lives. Some of them dug holes or rifle-pits in the sand were they would secrete themselves and fire upon us until they were killed. I saw at one time three Indians charge not less than 150 men. They came within forty yards, firing their revolvers and arrows until they were shot down. One squad was attempting to escape with her two children when she was shot down, but before she died drew her knife and cut the throats of