(Steele) desired him, and that he was expecting him then every day. This goes to confirm the statement of our spies on White River, that the Sixteenth Army Corps did go up White River on the eleven transports designated. At all events it is certain that troops of some kind passed up in the transports at the time specified and that they are in addition to the re-enforcements landed at the mouth of the river from Morganza, and suppose Grierson does not come this way will make General Steele's army at least 25,000 men exclusive of the troops at Fort Smith and Helena. Mrs. Bruce further states that much dissatisfaction is expressed by the Government with Steele for not having done more, and that General Steele declares that he will take Camden this fall. However, I hardly think he will attempt this unless Grierson should join him, when he certainly will.

It is certain from the above and from the enemy's policy, which the course of events has developed fully-his land attack upon Mobile and his concentration of troops in Arkansas-that neither Texas nor Louisiana is threatened in the least. Operations elsewhere will prevent the enemy's attacking the coast of Texas during the autumn, and the winter season is so unfavorable for operations on the Gulf that no expedition will be sent at the earliest, before next spring against her coast. It is also obvious that Louisiana, is safe from invasion until the rise of Red River. It will take troops a month to march from the coast of Texas to Arkansas and about an average of fifteen days from Louisiana. It will take the siege train a month to get from Houston with oxen to the Arkansas River, with mules about twenty days. I stated to the headquarters more than twenty days ago that troops (several thousand) could be spared from Texas for operations in Arkansas. Having had command of that district I felt myself at liberty to make that suggestion. I felt some delicacy in expressing any opinion as to the propriety of sending any additional troops from Louisiana to Arkansas. I was, however, satisfied that as soon as it was known by the enemy that re-enforcements would be sent by us to Arkansas he would move all his disposable forces by water to that State, and would be ready to confront us. I do not hesitate now to recommend that all the disposable forces, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, be sent both from Texas and Louisiana forthwith into Arkansas by the shortest routes, sustained by as heavy a siege train as can be procured, and for the following reasons; First. They are not at this time necessary for the safety of the countries from which they are drawn. Second. If General Price's invasion is successful these troops should be in hand ready to reduce the formidable fortifications by which Steele now holds Arkansas, and when the invasion of Louisiana takes place next winter these works could be strengthened, provisioned, and garrisoned, and these troops proceed to the defense of Louisiana or a portion of them go into Missouri to sustain Price if necessary . Third. Should Price's movement be unsuccessful, and Price obliged to fall back, it will require all these troops so to occupy the powerful enemy now in our front as to enable him to rejoin us. Fourth. Should Price's movement not draw the Federal troops after him into Missouri it is probable that the enemy will advance and endeavor to take the line of the Ouachita this fall and make that river the base of operations against Shreveport and Texas whenever Red River shall rise. Viewing the situation from every possible point, it seems to me that all the troops that can be spared should be concentrated in Arkansas with the least possible delay. I wish it to be clearly understood, however, that I do not recommend the removal of the artillery from the sea-coast of Texas, nor of any troops necessary there for