company of light artillery and three guns from the flotilla and 100 mounted men under Lieutenant Colonel Steele (the mounted portion of Waul's old legion). The Reserve Corps might be organized into regiments at once al all those not required for agricultural purpose, and not more than one-third might be ordered to these places, take the places of these troops, and be drilled and prepared for active service in the spring. Since the enemy has developed his plans on Mobile and Arkansas it is only necessary to secure the coast of Texas against a fleet, which can best be done by forts and heavy guns. It is the opinion of some of the most intelligent and influential men of Arkansas who are now here that this large concentration of force by the enemy indicates an immediate advance movement for the purpose of conquering the rest of the State. I have some other reasons to believe also that this is Steele's intention, though I cannot see how he can support an army except on the Arkansas and Bartholomew, or unless he captures our stores at Fulton. All this should be guarded against without the least loss of time. I would respectfully suggest that as Duff's regiment has gone to join Maxey, Bourland's and Martin's regiments be ordered to Fulton or Washington, and Duff's regiment also diverted to one of these points if it can be overtaken on the march. I have no means of knowing where he is. Should General Smith be able to send me Thomas' brigade and some other troops from Louisiana I shall be able to place 1,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry in front of Washington. This would leave me some 8,000 men at Monticello. Should I be threatened by a much heavier force I could fall back on my coming re-enforcements. Steele may be diverting my attention toward the mouth of the Arkansas whilst he marches on Washington or Shreveport. I had ordered Mitchell's brigade (600 men) from Washington here before I received news of Steele's heavy re-enforcements and they are now here; only State troops, about 700, in front of Washington. My object was to concentrate and attack Pine Bluff. I leave for Monticello to-morrow morning.

I am, general very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. MAGRUDER,

Major-General, Commanding, &c.

P. S. - A plan similar to the one indicated above by me concerning the defense of Texas, in connection with the Reserve Corps, was contemplated by me and recommended in a conversation with General Smith before I left Texas, and before I had any idea of being ordered to Arkansas, and I think urged it in a written communication.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. B. M

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, La., September 17, 1864.

Major General J. G. WALKER,

Commanding Texas, &c.;

GENERAL: I am directed by the general commanding to inclose herewith the report* of Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, chief engineer of the department, concerning the defenses of the Texas coast. The general commanding desires me to say it is his opinion that should the enemy attempt in force to reduce Galveston that it could not be held. He

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*Not found.

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