Camden, or from which the troops could be marched directly to the lower Red River. The difficulty of obtaining subsistence is a more serious question with the cavalry than the infantry arm of service, and, if we are to act on the defensive, will require the withdrawal of the body of the cavalry to the vicinity of Red River. The smallest amount of cavalry necessary for covering the approaches of the enemy from the Arkansas Valley should be retained in the exhausted country beyond the Ouachita and Little Missouri, and should be relieved from time to time from the cavalry camps in rear, where the horses have been rested and recruited. I think your estimate of the enemy's force in Arkansas is large. I should not place Steele's effective force, excluding Grierson, at more than 20,000. Grierson evidently crossed to the west bank of the Mississippi for operations against Shelby and Price, and has most probably gone to Missouri. Steele's effective force, before the re-enforcements reached him, was not over 10,000 effective men. His re-enforcements are Mower's division from the Sixteenth Army Corps, say 5,000, and the force from Morganza, reported by Captain Jones, of the Signal Corps, to have passed up the Mississippi River on 5th of September, in seven transports, say 4,000. The losses and gains by expiration of term of service and return of furloughed men probably balance each other. Of this force Mower's division was probably intended to act in the rear of Price, and, if not, to operate against him in Missouri to cut off his retreat. Steele is hardly in condition to undertake a campaign. The most that he can do will be to send a cavalry expedition to Red River. The movement of Price to Missouri makes this latter hardly probable, as it will give occupation to all of Steele's disposable cavalry. Until the fate of the Missouri expedition is determined we need expect no serious offensive operations from Arkansas. The inclosed dispatch* from General Buckner shows that more troops are proceeding up the Mississippi. Their destination is probably Missouri or the East. I wish you would instruct your scouts on the Mississippi and Arkansas to verify the correctness of this report and to discover the destination of the troops. I inclose you a copy of the report* referred to from Captain Jones, in which he estimates the troops on the transports at 6,000 or 7,000, and not 10,000. I will not, under the charge of circumstances in your district, insist upon offensive operation. You there can best judge of your ability to operate successfully and I know anxiously desire active work. If the re-enforcements sent to Steele made his position now unassailable, the success of Price in Missouri, by drawing upon him for troops, may soon so weaken him as to admit of offensive operations on your part. The expedition of Price to Missouri and the movement of our troops to Arkansas have already affected one of their objects in the abandonment of the siege of Mobile and in the concentration of the enemy's troops from that point, Mississippi and Tennessee, in Missouri and Northern Arkansas. If a raid should be made by the enemy toward the Red River Valley its line of operation will probably be by Arkadelphia and Washington, with the depots at Fulton and Jefferson as objective points. Whatever disposition is made of your force, a careful watch upon that line must be held. General Maxey was directed to concentrate his disposable force near Laynesport, where it would be in position to act in co-operation with yourself in any sudden advance of the enemy toward Washington.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY SMITH,

General.

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* Not found.

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