The ammunition of the train was directed by me sent to Alexandria and the wagons and mules prepared for that purpose before I left Texas. I presume that this ammunition, which is very heavy and requires many wagons, has already arrived at Alexandria, and that the wagons have returned by this time to Texas. I hear that 150 oxen were ready on the 19th of September last, and suppose that ten siege guns may now be on the way to Alexandria; if so, the same wagons can be employed, and these 150 oxen and the train brought to Little Rock in twenty-five of thirty days at farthest. This would bring us to the 12th or 15th of November. The weather here, it is said, frequently remains good until the 1st of January. If the whole number of guns could not be sent, two or three of the largest rifle guns and a few 8-inch howitzers might be sent as rapidly as possible, lest they might be required; but if none can be sent I would, however, make the demonstration and try to storm the place without them. It is worth a great effort and some risk in view of its effect not only upon the occupation of this State by the enemy but upon the permanency of our occupation of Missouri. I found it impossible to operate successfully from a point on the lower Arkansas, say South Bend, for these reasons:

First. Unless we could hold the valley, which depended upon our cutting off supplies and re-enforcements by railroad to Steele, at Little Rock, we could not possibly feed our army. I had to send back the division trains some sixty miles for breadstuffs, and the mules after another trip would have been almost unserviceable.

Second. The re-enforcements to Steele more than equaled the strength of my army, and these were disposed at Devall's Bluff, Saint Charles, and the mouth of Whiter River. All these are stations on White River. The rest of his forces were stationed on the railroad at Little Rock and at Pine Bluff.

Third. Major-General Wharton was ordered to find fords, if possible, on the Arkansas River, and after every effort he reported that there were no practicable fords on the river. Since then the river has risen. Our pontoon train could not reach more than half way across the river, and we should have been out of supplies before it could have been lengthened.

Under all these circumstances, to have placed the army or any considerable portion of it within the quadrangle of forts, with a treacherous river in its rear, and 5,000 men at the mouth of White River, which could have been thrown in rear of my troops on the other side of the Arkansas within a few hours by landing at Napoleon or Gaines' Landing, would have been madness. Having just arrived in the country, I laid before the general officers, some of whom were perfectly acquainted with the localities, the proposition to take Pine Bluff by assault. After deliberation it was, I believe, the general, the unanimous, opinion that the advantages to be obtained by it would not compensate for the loss which would be incurred in its capture, and I reluctantly decided to abandon it. My base of supplies - Fulton - and the seat of the Legislature - Washington - being all this time perfectly open to a raid of the enemy, I determined to place my forces in reach of both, particularly as I could not learn, notwithstanding constant efforts, where the re-enforcements of cavalry and those from A. J. Smith's corps had gone, except that a large force was concentrated at Austin, twenty-seven miles northeast of Little Rock.

I ascertained beyond a doubt that industrious preparations were being made by Steele for an expedition from Little Rock in some direction, and every indication pointed to a formidable raid on Washington,