arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, South Carolina, North Georgia and Alabama-results that I feel assured would ere long flow from the movement I allude to.

* * * *

In haste, my dear general, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

LOUISVILLE, January 13, 1862.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

Commanding U. S. Army.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I did not mean to be understood in my dispatch to the President as attaching little importance to the movemet on East Tennessee; on contrary it is evidently of the hights importance if throughly carried out. But I believe that if the other object were attained the same result would be accomplished quite as promptly and effectually. I have taken no step thus far that has not had that in view also. * * * The Tennessee arms are being unapacked and putin order and forwarded to Lebanon.

* * * *

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

P. S. - The plan of any colonel whoever he is for ending the war by entiring East Tennessee with his 5,000 men light-that is with pack-mules and three batteries of artillery, &c. -while the rest of the armies look on though it has some sensible patent ideas is in the aggregate simply ridiculous.

LOUISVILLE, KY., Febraury 1, 1862.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

Commanding U. S. Army.

MY DEAR GENERAL: * * * It is 200 miles or thereabouts from our depots (at the termious of the railroad) to Knoxville or the nearest point on the Tennessee railroad. At the best supplies are meager along the whole route and if they suffice for a trip or two must by that time be entirely exhausted for any distance that we can reach along both sides of the road.

From Somerest to Jacksborough we will scarcely find any at all. East Tennessee is almost entirely stripped of wheat by the enemy. In the productive region there is still a small surplus of corn and wheat. We must supply two-thirds of the ration from our depots here and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other stores. It will take 1,000 wagons constantly going to supply 10,000 men. * * *

If the number of troops and consequently the amount of hauling is increased the difficulty is increased in a greater proportion. The limited amount of forage on the route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisious for our men we must have forage our animals, a thing that is not to be lightly thought of.