in a given section of country, and the order should be held to take effect July 3, the day of its date, then the Confederate commissioner claims that paroles at Vicksburg were invalid under Order Numbers 207, which took effect July 3, as the surrender was July 4 by General Pemberton, who was not "commander of the army in the field" the commander of the department being General Johnston, who was then within a few miles, and the immediate superior of General Pemberton, who was not negotiated with in the act of capitulation at Vicksburg. Or, if it should be held that Order Numbers 207 took effect on July 8, the date of its notification to the Confederate commissioner, then the paroles at Port Hudson would be invalid, because that surrender was on the 9th of July by Colonel Gardner, an inferior officer of the C. S. Army, in command of a fortified post simply, who in no ordinary sense can be deemed to be a "commanding of an army in the field," he, in fact, being at that time under the command of General Johnston.

And it was further claimed that upon this point General Banks had himself given a construction as to what was meant by a "commander of an army of the field" by refusing to recognize the paroles of the colonel commanding at New Iberia, who, being a subordinate of General Banks, surrendered to General Dick Taylor, commanding Confederate forces, and negotiated paroles of himself and men without the consent of his immediate superior, General Banks, who was at that time farther distant with the remainder of his army from New Iberia, where the surrender was effected, than was General Johnston from Port Hudson at the time Colonel Gardner, the commander there, negotiated the surrender of that fortified place with General Banks.

There might be other cases cited on the part of the United States, but these claims of the Confederate commissioner will sufficiently illustrate the importance of the question, and the necessity of agreeing, in case the exchange goes on, upon some call obviate this difficulty; and therefore the definition was suggested which appears upon the points discussed, to wit, that in addition to the general meaning, it ought to include a commander of a besieging force and the commander of the fortified place besieged, also to commanders of detached forces acting for the time independently of headquarters, either by order or because of the necessities of warlike operations where it is in the power of the captor to hold and bring off his prisoners.

And it was further suggested that to cover all these cases of difficulty, both on the one side and on the other, as to the time General Orders, Numbers 207, should take effect, that it should be held to take effect within a reasonable time after its promulgation for the order to have reached the commanding officer giving the paroles, which time should be judged of according to the distance from Washington. And I think upon both these points an agreement upon the basis here suggested may be arrived at, so as to settle without further debate the capitulation of both Vicksburg and Port Hudson and others standing in like case. In order to prevent any temptation for the capturing party to take along the sick and wounded of the other party who are not able to be moved another modification of General Orders, Numbers 207, was suggested, to wit, that when the captured party is disabled so that his transportation would endanger life or limb his own parole should be respected if he is released.

To prevent the complications which now arise by the unauthorized, sporadic, and ill-judge acts of some officers holding commands in the rebel forces I suggested another addition to the cartel, which is found as the last point of discussion, to wit: In all cases of condemnation to