Such pretension is groundless on the analogous principles of military law and all past usage in war. Even as persons held to previous service,lone in that character, deserting to or enlisting with the enemy, are on recapture invariably held by their captors subject to the previous obligation of service. The most familiar example of the principle is in the common case of deserters. The invariable practice is not to hold such as prisoners of war, but to consider them amenable to their original obligations of service. So the inhabitants of any country who, although not in the military service, yet owing allegiance, have enlisted with the enemy are invariably on being captured held amenable to their precedent relations. In view of these well-settled practices, how can it be contended slaves or persons

bound to service by being forced or seduced away by the enemy on being recaptured are not to be held subject to their former obligation and liable to be restored to those entitled to their service? Such, too, was the established principle and practice of the American States in their Revolutionary struggle, during which just complaint was constantly made of the removal of slaves by seizure or enticement on the part of the enemy. Such slaves retaken were always, without doubt or without remonstrance on the part of the British officers or authorities, returned to the service of their former owners.

During the last war of the United States with Great Britain similar denunciation was indulged by the authorities of the former against the abstraction of slaves, and there was the like return of recaptured slaves to their owners. At the close of the war, too, indemnity was insisted on for the value of slaves taken away, and pecuniary compensation for the property thus lost was actually secured by treaty. In all the diplomatic correspondence and negotiations of the late United States with foreign nations on the subject of slaves abstracted, that Government was fully committed to maintain the prior obligations of slaves, and likewise to recognize their value as property. The late United States are estopped by the precedents and principles of the past action of that Government and Union they still continue among themselves from denying positions in entire accordance therewith retained and insisted on by their former associates, now the Confederate States.

As a political question the organic law of their Government distinctly recognizes the relations of slaves as persons bound to service, and imposes the obligation of the return of fugitives. Suppose in a State claimed by them as one of the present Union, where slavery exists, slaves had been seized or had run away to the Confederacy, on being recaptured does not their own Constitution clearly enjoin the obligation of surrender to the owner? Similar is the obligation of the Confederate Government under the Constitution of the Confederate States, and by it at least must be respected and executed. Over the relations of the slave and his owner the Confederate Government, as the Government of the United States, under its organic law, has no jurisdiction or control. They pertain exclusively to the respective States. It is incumbent, however, on the common Government to maintain and defend these relations, to respect the obligations of service and rights of property established by them, and to sanction the reclamation and return of all recaptured or fugitive slaves. No alternative, therefore, exists, if the cruel and unwarrantable proceedings instituted toward our captured officers and men be persisted in, but to maintain an impregnable position, enjoined by organic law and sustained by justice and international law, at the cost of whatever faithful consequences to the