the Government, so also it is clear that his interest are not endangered by his willful absence at the time of his conviction, when his personal presence at such time is, by the universal rules of military procedure, inadmissible under any circumstances. The supreme courts of Indiana and Ohio sustain this view in several carefully considered opinion. In 7 Ohio Reports, No, 180, Charles Fight vs. The States, where, in the court below, the present plaintiff in error, there defendant had made default, and the jury brought in a verdict of guilty, notwithstanding the prisoner's absence, the supreme court of Ohio overrules his motion in arrest of judgment, in an opinion of which the following is a synopsis:

Where, pending a trial upon a criminal prosecution, the accused, being on bail, absconds, it is legal to proceed with the case and to receive a verdict of guilty in his absence.

The court rests its opinion upon the following grounds: In England, in misdemeanors, where defendant is on bail, a trial, conviction, or sentence may be had in his absence. But for this difference it is difficult to assign a satisfactory reason. Both before and after the conquest all felonious were bailable by the ancient common law, except treason, murder, and other specified crimes, but the court of King's Bench or any judge thereof may, in vacation, admit at their discretion any person to bail, in all cases whatsoever, though none can claim this benefit court says:

If the prisoners is on trial, I apprehend neither the courts in Great Britain nor the United States would proceed to impanel a jury in a trial for felony unless the accused were present to look to his challenges. If, however, the trial is once commenced and the prisoner, on his own wrong, leaves the court, abandons his case to the management of counsel, and runs away, I can find no adjudged case to sustain the position that in England the proceedings would be stayed. * * * The prisoner cannot be deprived of his right to be present at all stages of his trial, but that he must be, under all circumstances, or the proceedings will be erroneous, cannot, we think, be sustained.

A similar view is taken by the supreme court of Indiana, the State in which the present trial took place, in the case of McCorkle vs. The State, reported in 14th Indiana Reports, page 39. In the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Perkins, the following language is used:

The Constitution and laws provide that a defendant in a criminal case shall be present at his trial. This is for a twofold object. First, that the defendant may have the opportunity of meeting the witnesses and jury face to face and of directing the course of his trial; second, that the State may be in possession of his person, so that judgment be executed thereon.

The judge then goes on to argue that these provisions are designed to confer a privilege on the accused which he may waive:

He can waive a trial altogether by pleading guilty; he can waive a trial by jury; he can waive the privileges of exemption from being a second time out in jeopardy; and can it be said that he cannot waive his privilege of being present when his witnesses are examined or any of them? If, in the case at bar, the accused had asked permission to be absent in the custody of an officer or otherwise, requesting that the trial should go on in his absence, the waiver would be clear. But how does such a step differ in substance from a voluntary departure was the trial shall stop? In the one case the consent is vocally, in the other tacitly, but equally clearly, expressed.

In the case of the State vs. Warnire, 16th Indiana Reports, page 357, Judge Perkins delivered the opinion that the court is not bound to discharge the jury because of the voluntary absence of the defendant during the trial, he having been present at its commencement, but may