General A. L. Lee and a detachment of the Thirteenth Corps, under Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom. Upon reaching the front I found the line of skirmishers already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, although but few had yet shown themselves. It soon appeared that our march was likely to be resisted by a stronger force than had yet been encountered. I instantly sent orders for the rapid advance of the troops to the front, though without notice or anticipation of a general engagement. The active movements of our skirmishers soon developed a strong line of the enemy in position, extending at some length on the right and left of the line of march in front of the Sabine Cross-Roads. It had been deemed of considerable importance to occupy this position by our forces in order to prevent a concentration of the forces of the enemy. General Ransom moved forward to the support of the cavalry, and the skirmishers opened a running fire, which lasted for some hours, though without developing the full strength of the enemy's forces or position. At 4 o'clock on the 8th, a tremendous fire suddenly opened along the whole of this line on the right and left of the road, when it became manifest that the enemy in full force and in strong position was in our front. The contest lasted for an hour, our troops resisting with remarkable spirit and courage the onset of the enemy, until, utterly overpowered by numbers, they were compelled to fall back upon the rear of the column. A sharp ravine or gully separated the plain where this engagement had commenced from the belt of almost impenetrable woods through which we had marched. On passing this point it appeared that the entire cavalry train, with its artillery, occupied the road nearly to the line of skirmishers. The fatal consequences of this most incautious advance of trains and artillery were apparent upon the breaking of our lines in front of the enemy's position. Upon the retreat of the advanced guard the enemy instantaneously enveloped the train of wagons, and it was impossible to withdraw the artillery in consequence of the preoccupation of the ground by the wagons; and the encumbered roads impeded the movements of troops and caused many prisoners to fall into the hands of the enemy. The disasters of the day are to be attributed to the fatally incautious advance of the large cavalry train and the surplus artillery rather than to the strength of the enemy, his unexpected resistance, or the deficient valor of our troops. It is always difficult to ascertain the position of a concealed adversary, and temporary defeat is to be expected when the front of an advancing column encounters the base of that of the enemy.

Every possible exertion was made to rally and reform the forces which had been engaged, but all efforts failed. The loss of prisoners, artillery, and wagons and the fierce pursuit of a victorious and desperate foe for the moment seemed to paralyze individuals and masses. The troops fell back, for the most part in good order, fighting in front of the enemy, the men retaining their arms until toward sunset, when the First Division of the Nineteenth Corps, Brigadier General W. H. Emory commanding, had advanced to our support. Under cover of a line of skirmishers from its First Brigade, the division deployed into line of battle on the crest of a hill, General Dwight's brigade on the right, Colonel Benedict's brigade on the left, and McMillan's in reserve. The unexpected encounter with this force, while in pursuit of what he thought a routed army, was very desperate. He attacked the line at every point with demoniac energy, but the division presented at every onset an immovable wall of fire; and