made it dangerous to undertake the proposed movement. Some of the boats of the fleet were aground, and it was the opinion of the admiral, unequivocally expressed, upon consultation with him, that it was inexpedient for the army or navy to advance until the rise of the river was assured. The Eastport, in moving down the river, had run aground, and was with great difficulty got afloat. When, from the condition of the river, it became apparent that neither the army nor the fleet could move to Shreveport with any reasonable prospect of a return, I directed that the army should fall back to Alexandria. In the mean time the Eastport, one of the most important of the naval vessels, ran aground about 8 miles below Natchitoches. No movement of the army was made until information was received that the Eastport was afloat. Our train was put en route for Alexandria at 4 p. m. on the 21st, and on the morning of the 22nd the troops took up the line of march. Information had been received from various sources that considerable bodies of the enemy had been moving from our front to our rear, for a purpose not definitely ascertained. It was represented that the object was either to attack Alexandria, to obstruct our return by occupying Monett's Bluff, on Cane River, or to take up a position at the mouth of that stream for the purpose of intercepting the passage of the transports. To prevent the successful accomplishment of either of these purposes of the enemy the army made a rapid march from Natchitoches to Monett's Bluff. The information we had received as to the movements of the enemy were verified. A strong force, variously represented from 5,000 to 7,000, with two batteries of artillery, were found to be in position at Monett's Bluff, and occupying the only road which was accessible to the army in its movements toward Alexandria. This was undoubtedly the force which had contemplated an attack upon Alexandria.

On the morning of the 23rd, preparations were made to dislodge the enemy from this position. A force of 5,000 men, composed of a division of the Nineteenth Corps, under General Birge, and a division of the Thirteenth, under General Cameron, the whole being under command of General Birge, crossed Cane River on the right of the enemy's position, and by a flank march of several miles reached a hill, the occupation of which rendered Monett's Bluff untenable to the enemy. The possession of this height was of vital importance to either army. It was heavily wooded, protected by deep ravines, and covered a position which, occupied by the enemy, seemed well nigh impregnable. The forces under General Birge assailed this position at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 23rd, and after a very spirited and gallant contest of two hours or more carried the hill and compelled the retreat of the enemy. Our loss in this action in killed and wounded was from 150 to 200. A full list of the killed and wounded will be forwarded as speedily as possible. Among the wounded was Colonel Fessenden, of the Thirtieth Maine Volunteers, who commanded the assailing brigade. The troops in the front, immediately upon the success of the force on the right, occupied the bridge and the bluff commanding the river, where we rested for the night. The wounded were brought in and proper attention paid to the burial of the dead. The troops halted in this position during the night, the trains being sent forward early in the morning.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, six guns were fired by the enemy at our rear. This was apparently a concerted signal to the forces in occupation of the bluff on the 23rd, that the enemy in the