until it was definitely ascertained that his assistance would fail us, and that my force would be insufficient to advance farther upon this line against the enemy, who appeared to be in full force, I should entertain no thought of a retrograde movement, and never if it left the navy in any danger. No such purpose was then entertained, and until I received information in reply to my dispatches it was my purpose to maintain my position. A copy of this letter is appended to this report.

The next day I received instructions from Lieutenant-General Grant (to which I have referred) that if my return to New Orleans was delayed one day beyond the 1st of May, when it would be necessary for my command to co-operate with other armies in the spring campaign, it would have been better that the expedition had never been attempted. These instructions, with the fact that the river was not likely to rise, the report received by Captain R. T. Dunham that General Steele could not co-operate with us, and that the difficulty of passing the falls at Alexandria was hourly increasing, if the passage was not even then impossible, led me to change my determination. It was not, however, until the entire fleet was free, transports and gun-boats, and that Admiral Porter, in charge of the Eastport, which had been aground several miles below Grand Ecore for several days, had sent me word by Colonel W. S. Abert (whose statement is hereto appended) that she was clear and further protection unnecessary, that orders were given the 21st April to turn the supply trains in the direction of Alexandria.

The army moved on the morning of the 22nd of April, every vessel having preceded both the marching orders and the movements of the army. Any statement from Whatever source that the army contemplated moving from Grand Ecore toward Alexandria against the advice or without the approval of the naval officers in command, or until after the departure of every vessel on the river, is without the slightest color of truth. In my interview with Admiral Porter, on the 15th of April, he expressed the utmost confidence that the river would rise, and gave me no intimation of his leaving Grand Ecore, nor of the proposed withdrawal of his vessels, or of his apprehensions of the retreat of the army. I gave him at that time distinct information of my plans, which were to advance. This fact was communicated to Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in my letter of the 17th of April. The admiral expressed the same confidence in the rise of the river to officers of the army, who from long experience in the Red River country were equally confident that it would not rise. The difficulties attending the voyage of the Eastport were incident to the condition of the river, for which the army was in no wise responsible. I had offered every assistance possible, and did not leave this position while any aid was suggested or required. Colonel Bailey, after consultation with the general officers of the army, offered to float the Eastport over the bars by the construction of wing-dams, similar to those afterward built at Alexandria, but the assistance was declined. No counsel from army officers was regarded in nautical affairs.

The army marched from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22nd of April, having been detained there by the condition of the navy ten days, to prevent the occupation of Monett's Bluff, on Cane River, a strong position, commanding the only road leading across the river to Alexandria, or to prevent the concentration of the enemy's forces at that point. If it was in his possession it became