Admiral Porter's published official statements, relating to the Red River campaign, are at variance with the truth, of which there are many thousand living witnesses, and do foul injustice to the officers and soldiers of the army, living and dead, to whom the Navy Department owes exclusively the preservation and honor of its fleet.

The partial disintegration of the several commands assigned to this expedition was a cause of embarrassment, though not entirely of failure. The command of Major-General Steele, which I was informed by Major-General Sherman would be about 15,000 men, was in fact but 7,000, and operating upon a line several hundred miles distant, with purposes and results entirely unknown to me. February 5, I was informed by General Steele that if any advance was to be made it must be by the Washita and Red Rivers, and that he might be able to move his command by the way of Pine Bluff to Monroe for this purpose. This would have united our forces on Red River and insured the success of the campaign. The 28th of February he informed me that he could not move by the way of Monroe, and on the 4th of March, the day before my command was ordered to move, I was informed by General Sherman that he had written to General Steele to "push straight to Shreveport." March 5, I was informed by General Halleck that he had no information of General Steele to "push straight to Shreveport." March 5, I was informed by General Halleck that he had no information of General Steele's plans further than that he would be directed to facilitate my operations toward Shreveport. The 10th of March General Steele informed me that the objections to the route I wished him to take (by the way of Red River) were stronger than ever, and that he "would move with all his available force (about 7,000) to Washington, and thence to Shreveport."

I received information the 26th of March, dated the 5th of March, from Major-General Halleck, that he had "directed General Steele to make a real move, as suggested by you (Banks), instead of a demonstration as he (Steele) thought advisable." In April General Halleck informed me that he had telegraphed General Steele "to co-operate with you (Banks) on Red River with all his available forces." April 16, I was informed, under date of the 10th, by General Sherman, that General Steele's entire force would co-operate with me and the navy.

In May I received information from General Steele, under date of the 28th* of April, that he could not leave Camden unless supplies were sent to him, as those of the country were exhausted; that we "could not help each other operating on lines so wide apart;" that he could not say definitely that he could join me "at any point on Red River at any given time," and, from the distance that separated us, that I could render no assistance of him-an opinion in which I entirely concurred. I never received authority to give orders to General Steele. My instructions limited me to communication with him upon the subject of the expedition. His orders he received from other sources. I have no doubt that General Steele did all in his power to insure success,, but as communication with him was necessarily by special messenger, and occupied from fifteen to twenty days at each communication, it was impossible for either of us fully to comprehend the relative positions of the two armies, or to assist or to support each other.

The column of General A. J. Smith was a partially independent command. General Sherman, in his dispatch of the 10th of April, received the 16th, informed me that the thirty days for which he had loaned me General Smith's command would expire on the 10th

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*See Steele to Banks, April 23, Part III, p. 267.

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