Re-enforcements were urgently demanded from the front. These demands were not such as called for response until about 3 p. m., or perhaps a little later. General Franklin had by this time made his usual day's march, and ordered his command of infantry into camp, for rest, supper, and, perhaps, for the night, should more favorable reports reach him. Immediately after camping orders had been given reports were received that induced him to order the other division of the Thirteenth Corps to the front, and the First Division of the Nineteenth Corps to march immediately after taking supper. General Banks and staff had already proceeded rapidly to the front. Soon after the latter-mentioned division of the Thirteenth Army Corps had started, General Franklin and staff proceeded on to the front. Before our arrival the troops already at the front had been engaged, were repulsed, and in part had stampeded. As I have before stated, General Lee had his train immediately in his rear, and in the road. Knowing that re-enforcements of infantry and artillery were coming up, and the road, narrow and skirted with heavy timber and underbrush, would be required for the passage of the cavalry trains, as I had advance I directed the teams to leave the road, by hauling to one side. To my surprise, on reaching the advance of this train, I found its quartermasters turning the teams about in the road, faced to the rear, and this by direction of their superior officers, brigade or division commanders. The certain confusion bound to result from this movement struck me so forcibly that I immediately controverted the orders, on my own responsibility, and directed these quartermasters to move their teams out of the road, and those already turned to the rear to remain out of the road, on the ground they found themselves. In the mean time the batteries and troops were passing to the front, and with but little difficulty. To account for the unusual position of the train I will further add that General Franklin and General Lee both wanted the cavalry train to move in rear of the infantry force, but both generals disagreed as to the precedence of position when the trains should be joined. General Lee desired that his train should precede General Franklin's infantry train, and the latternamed general insisted that the infantry trains should move in rear of the infantry force. Because of this disagreement no change was made on this day of the engagement. The most serious loss of men and material occurred on this day. Just before the close of this day, about 5 p. m., the advantage was with the enemy. At 6 o'clock the First Division of the Nineteenth Army Corps came into position, and after a spirited fight of half an hour the enemy was severely checked and retired. Night trains reached Pleasant Hill about 9 a. m., April 9. The troops on arrival at this place, a little later, were placed in position to receive the enemy, who were following closely. At about 10 o'clock the command of General A. J. Smith reached the position from Grand Ecore, from which point it had been ordered up to reenforce the advance. Orders were issued about the same time to resume the march to the rear to Grand Ecore. After an issue of provisions the trains were put in motion. At 3 p. m. the last team had left the ground. Anticipating the attack to commence every moment, the entire force, excepting the cavalry, was put in position,