fusion or difficulty to the front or rear, as might be necessary. A bridge was being built over the creek I have referred to, Major-General Banks and staff and Major-General Franklin and staff being for a time present observing its construction. As soon as the bridge was completed the train began to cross, and Major-General Franklin then directed me to keep my train closed up. I think his words were, "Do your best to keep the train well closed." The train was accordingly advanced steadily until it reached the point where it was finally captured. Here it was halted on account of the heavy was finally captured. Here it was halted on account of the heavy firing in front. I then moved the greater portion of my train to an open space on either side of the road. The train remained in this position until Brigadier-General Cameron's command and two batteries of artillery had passed by me up to the front. Having been to the front, from my own observation and the information I received I thought it possible that the troops in front might be compelled to fall back until re-enforcements came up, and, if so, they would require then open space my train then occupied to form new lines of battle. I therefore asked Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, chief quartermaster, if I had not better move my train back, and he replied, "No; you must not run a single wagon;" adding, "If you lose your wagons lose them facing the enemy." I therefore remainder with the trains in the position I have described until the rout became general, when I received an order from Major Howe, acting assistant adjutant-general, Cavalry Division, to move my train to the rear, which order I commenced to execute, when i found the road in my rear, at a point near a slough, blockaded by capsized and stalled teams belonging to another brigade, which made it wholly impossible to carry out the order further. In this position the entire train was captured. I would further state that previous to the instructions I received from Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, Captain Hoge, division quartermaster told me that the instructions were positive not to move the train to the rear.

I am, colonel, very respectfully,

F. H. WHITTIER,

Captain and Actg. Asst. Quartermaster, Fourth Brigadier

Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY,

Commanding Fourth Brigade, Cav. Division.

Numbers 86. Report of Captain Elbert H. Fordham, Thirty-first Massachusetts Mounted Infantry, of operations May 14-18.

HDQRS. THIRTY-FIRST MASSACHUSETTS VOLS. (CAVALRY),
Near Morganza, May 22, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Thirty-first Massachusetts Volunteers (Cavalry) moved with the brigade from Chambers' plantation on the morning of the 14th instant. By order of Colonel Davis I reported with the regiment to Major Marsh, Second Illinois Cavalry, commanding the rear guard. At about 2 p. m. the enemy attacked our rear and brought a force of from 200 to 300 on our left flank. By direction of Major Marsh I dismounted the regiment, repulsed the attack in rear, and drove the enemy from our left. In this engagement my loss was 2 killed and 1 wounded. On the 15th, skirmishers with the enemy on the left in woods; no casualties.

30 R R-VOL XXXIV, PT I