central position at Shreveport, with the enemy's columns approaching from opposite directions, I proposed drawing them to within striking distance, when, by concentrating upon and striking them in detail, both columns might be crippled or destroyed. (See extract from Taylor's letters, M and N.)

On April 4, Churchill's and Parsons' divisions were ordered to Keachie, within supporting distance of General Taylor, at Mansfield. On the morning of April 5, I repaired to General Taylors' headquarters at Mansfield, and on the afternoon of same day returned to Shreveport, from which point the operations of Generals Price and Taylor's commands could best be directed.

In my interview with General Taylor at Mansfield on April 5, my plan of operations was distinctly explained. He agreed with me and expressed his belief that General Steele, being the bolder and more active, would advance sooner and more rapidly than Banks, and was the column first to be attacked.

General Taylor having reported the advance of the enemy's cavalry to Pleasant Hill, on the morning of April 8, I wrote him the inclosed letter (numbered 2595). His headquarters was between four and five hours by courier from Shreveport. The action was unexpectedly brought on by Mouton engaging the enemy at 5 o'clock in the evening of April 8.

I received General Taylor's dispatch announcing the engagement at 4 o'clock on the morning of April 9, and rode 65 miles that day to Pleasant Hill, but did not reach there in time for the battle, which opened at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. On April 10, General Taylor returned with me to Mansfield, where the further operations of the campaign were discussed and determined upon by us. Banks was in full retreat, with the cavalry in pursuit. Our infantry was withdrawn by General Taylor to Mansfield for supplies. The country below Natchitoches had been completely desolated and stripped of supplies. the navigation of the river was obstructed, and even had our whole force been available for pursuit it could not have been subsisted below Natchitoches. General Steele was advancing, and to have pushed our whole force in pursuit of a fleeing enemy, while Steele's column was in position to march upon our base and destroy our depots and shops, would have been sacrificing the advantages of our central position and abandoning the plan of campaign at the very time we were in position to have insured its success.

General Taylor agreed with me that the main body of our infantry should be pushed moving to Arkansas. He selected the troops that were to remain, placed General Polignac in command, and gave him his instructions for pushing the retreating army of General Banks.

On the morning of April 11, I returned to Shreveport and made preparations for the prosecution of the campaign in Arkansas. On April 14, I received information that Steele had turned the head of his column and was moving toward Camden. General Price was instructed that the infantry were moving to his support. He was ordered to throw his force within the fortifications at Camden if he believed himself strong enough to hold them against General Steele. (See 2687.) I too weak he was directed to throw a division of cavalry across the Ouachita and intercept all communication with and cut off all supplies going into Camden. (See 2678.)

General Taylor arrived at Shreveport on the morning of April 16.