armament in conjunction with the advance of his infantry column [sic]. In accordance with this view, I had established last fall subsistence and forage depots along the road through the barren country between Texas an Red River and between Camden and Natchitoches. I omitted to state that I had been obliged to keep a force in the Indian Territory to hold in check several thousand men under Thayer at Fort Smith, and to cover Northern Texas, filled with disloyal people. The water in the beginning of February being in a stage to admit gun-boats into Red River, General Banks suddenly transferred his force to Ne Orleans and Berwick Bay, leaving but 6,000 or 8,000 men in Matagorda Peninsula, who subsequently joined him at Alexandria after the retreat from Mansfield.

Between February 21 and 26, I directed General Magruder to hold Green's division in constant marching order. On March 6, the division was ordered to move with dispatch to join General Taylor, who was embarrassed for want of cavalry.

On March 12, a body of 8,000 or 10,000 men, composed of portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, under General A. J. Smith, moved down from Vicksburg to Simsport, and subsequently advanced with such celerity on Fort De Russy, taking it in reverse, that General Taylor was not allowed time to concentrate and cover this most important work, our only means of arresting the progress of the gun-boats. The fall of the work and the immediate movement of the enemy by means of his transports to Alexandria placed General Taylor i a very embarrassing situation. He extricated himself, with his characteristic tact, by a march of 70 miles through the pine woods. Banks now pressed forward from Berwick Bay by the line of the Teche, and by the aid of steamers both on the Mississippi and Red Rivers concentrated at Alexandria a force of 30,000 men, supported by the most powerful naval armament ever employed on a river.

As soon as I had received intelligence of the debarkation of the enemy at Simsport, I ordered General Price to dispatch his entire infantry to Shreveport, and General Maxey to move toward Price, and when Steele advanced, to join Price with his whole command, Indians included. The cavalry east of the Ouachita was directed to fall back toward Natchitoches, and subsequently to oppose, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy's fleet. It was under command of General Liddell. All disposable infantry detachments in Texas were directed on Marshall; and although the enemy still had a force of several thousand on the coast, I reduced the number of men holding the defenses to an obsolete minimum. General Magruder's field report show that but 2,300 men were left in the entire District of Texas. Except these, every effective soldier in the department was put in front of Steele or in support of Taylor. When this was accomplished the disparity in numbers was frightful. Taylor had at Mansfield, after the junction of Green, 11,000 effective, with 5,000 infantry from Price's army in one day's march of him at Keachie. Price, with 6,000 or 8,000 cavalry, was engaged in impeding the advance of Steele, whose column did not number less than 15,000 of all arms. Banks pushed on to Natchitoches. It was expected he would be detained there several days i accumulating supplies. Steele, on the Little Missouri, and Banks, at Natchitoches, were either but about 100 miles from Shreveport or Marshall. The character of the country did not admit of their forming a junction above Natchitches, and if they advanced equally I hope by refusing one to fight the