mand, and that you had known for some time of Steele's retreat. I repeated the arguments against the movement, but was overruled. In justification of your policy you observed that it was an affair of a few days, and in answer to my inquiry stated positively that Walker's division was not to be removed from my command. You state that the fruits of the victory of Mansfield were secured by the march of the column against Steele, and that the complete success of the campaign was determined by his overthrow at Jenkins' Ferry. After a series of engagements Banks was driven into his works at Alexandria on April 28, two days before the fight at Jenkins' Ferry and on the day of that fight the river was completely blockaded below Alexandria against both transports and gun-boats. I am at a loss to conceive what connection the fruits of Mansfield have with the fight at Jenkins' Ferry. Some time before this fight you directed Walker to report to me but changed your mind and ordered him to Camden. Immediately after the fight your ordered Walker and Churchill and Parsons to join me, which shows that even in your opinion the Red River was the theater of events.

At Jenkins' Ferry you attacked with your infantry alone. Nearly 8,000 men were not used at all, either in the fight or after it. This surplus of troops might well have enabled you to leave Walker with me. At Jenkins' Ferry you lost more heavily in killed and wounded than the enemy. This appears from the official report of Steele, confirmed by our officers who were present. You lost two pieces of artillery, which the enemy did not carry off because he had previously been deprived of means of transportation by Maxey and Fagan. He burned his pontoon for the same reason, and because after crossing the Saline he had no further use for it. He marched to Little Rock after the fight entirely unmolested. He would unquestionably have gone there had the fight never occurred. We do not to-day hold one foot more of Arkansas than if Jenkins' Ferry had never been, and we have a jaded army and 1,000 less soldiers. How, then, was the "complete success of the campaign determined by Steele's overthrow at Jenkins' Ferry?" In truth, the campaign as a whole has been a hideous failure. The fruits of Mansfield have been turned to dust and ashes. Louisiana, from Natchitoches to the Gulf, is a howling wilderness and her people are starving. Arkansas is probably as great a sufferer. In both States abolition conventions are sitting to overthrow their system of labor. The remains of Banks' army have already gone to join Grant or Sherman, and may turn the scale against our overmatched brethren in Virginia and Georgia.

On April 24 [23] the affair of Monett's Ferry took place. The Federals admit that a few hours' more delay would have led to the destruction of their army. Admiral Porter in his official report states this army to be 35,000 strong. The destruction of the army would have led of necessity, to the destruction of the fleet. These advantages were all thrown away, to the utter destruction, of the best interests of the country, and in their place we have Jenkins' Ferry. Our material of war is exhausted our men are broken down with long marches from Red River to Arkansas and from Arkansas back to Red River. About 1,000 of the best officers and men were sacrificed and no result attained. The roads to Saint Louis and New Orleans should now be open to us. Your strategy has riveted the fetters on both. At Jenkins' Ferry the tactical skill which carried Churchill's, Parsons', and Walker's division successively into the fight after its predecessor had been driven back, and which [you] failed to use at all, either in the fight or in a pursuit, a force of over