Churchil's, Parsons', and most of Walker's command being in great confusion. On our left Walker and Polignac had rather the advantage of the enemy without gaining any material results. Our troops were withdrawn. Polignac remained about 2 miles from the field. Walker, Churchill, and Parsons, with all the cavalry except one brigade, moved back 6 miles, the nearest point at which there was sufficient water. Neither our cavalry nor that of the enemy did anything in this fight.

The next morning, after sunrise, very much to our surprise, we learned that the enemy had retreated during the night. The cavalry was immediately sent in pursuit, while the infantry was taken back to Mansfield for organization, rest, and supplies. The enemy evidently considered himself whipped. He ought to know. Independently of the condition of the troops after the fight, the want of supplies below Mansfield and of transportation to haul them rendered immediate pursuit with our whole force impossible. Below Mansfield all was a howling wilderness. The only way in which a large body of troops there could be supplied was by the river, which at this time was occupied by the gun-boats of the enemy up to within 30 miles of Shreveport. Furthermore, the enemy's land force, even though it should be demoralized, had at all times the guns of their fleet, upward of one hundred in number, for a protection. At best our chase, had we been able to advance, would have wound up at the Mississippi, with that barrier to our farther progress, and with nothing more accomplished than would be done by the enemy himself if let alone. A campaign against New Orleans, had there been no enemy in the country besides Banks, would have been utter madness. On the other hand, Steele, with 11,000 men, was moving on Camden, from the fortifications at which point he could, in perfect security from our cavalry, watch our operations, and if and opportunity offered, strike at Jefferson, Marshall, or Shreveport. To leave him in this position, and transfer all our troops except our cavalry left in Arkansas to Lower Louisiana, would be to jeopardize our very salvation. Northward great results would follow Steele's signal defeat. The regaining of the Arkansas Valley and the breaking up of the Yankee State government, as well as having the route to Missouri open, were considerations of great importance. These results accomplished, the numerical strength of our armies might soon be doubled. For these reasons General Smith determined to move against Steele, and accordingly Walker's, Parsons', and Churchill's divisions were put in motion.

Here is the point: General Taylor and his friends assert with the most confident assurance that had he been allowed to "follow up his victory" the utter destruction of Banks and Porter would have been the result. Perhaps the exact force of this argument can be appreciated only by persons who saw General Taylor's victorious army just after it had attempted to destroy a part of General Banks' force without the fleet to support it; but still the idea of our annihilating in their entrenchments a force three-fourths of which we had failed to whip in open fight, and of transporting over a distance of 250 miles supplies we had been unable to haul 65 miles. Such projects must appear in their entrenchments a force three-fourths of which we had failed to whip in open fight, and of transporting over a distance of 250 miles supplies we had been unable to haul 65 miles. Such projects must appear in their true light to any sensible person who looks calmly and impartially into the matter. It was impossible for the enemy to maintain permanently at Natchitoches a force sufficient to hold the place. Red River must soon fall, and supplies would then have to be hauled from Simsport. The country would supply