at, of 15,000 to 17,000 infantry, thirty or forty pieces of light artillery, and a small cavalry force not exceeding 300. The enemy had no subsistence or baggage trains, and only his ordnance and hospital wagons.

In taking position at Bout De Bayou it had been my intention to give the enemy battle and hold him in check, at least until Mouton's brigade, which I supposed would reach me that night, could come up; but I soon found that the force of enemy was so overwhelming that my small division, numbering but 3,828 muskets present and twelve light guns, was entirely unequal to the task of checking more than momentarily the advance of the enemy. The position I had chosen offered some advantages against an enemy not so unequal in numbers, and if the swamps had been covered with water, as they usually are at this season of the year, even against a largely superior force; but the unusual dryness of the season had rendered the swampy grounds above and below Bout De Bayou bridge passable for artillery and trains, and rendered my position extremely hazardous, inasmuch as I was on [an] island formed by Red River, Bayous De Glaize, Du Lac, and Choctaw. the only outlet to which was Bayou Du Lac bridge, 8 miles to the south. In the event of the enemy turning my right, which he could easily have done, my march to Bayou Du Lac would have been intercepted and the destruction of my command inevitable. To have fallen back toward Marksville in order to cover fort De Russy would equally have insured the disaster. By falling back, however, toward Bayou Du Lac and watching the movements of the enemy I was in hopes of finding an opportunity of attacking him should he march upon Fort De Russy with less than his entire strength. The prairie country through which the enemy would pass would give me an excellent opportunity for observing his movements and estimating his strength. All these considerations induced me to adopt the only course not dictated by folly or madness; and however mortifying it might be to abandon our brave companions in arms at Fort De Russy to their fate, it became my imperative duty to do so rather than attempt assistance, which at best could delay this danger but a few hours, and without a miracle from Heaven would insure the certain destruction of my entire command. I have never had a doubt about the propriety of my course, but do not expect to escape malignant criticisms. If they come from responsible sources I know how to meet them, and only ask that they be made in an open manner.

I commenced my movement to Bayou Du Lac bridge at 10 a. m. on the 14th, and not until the enemy, having repaired the burnt bridge over Bayou De Glaize, had commenced crossing his infantry in force. The road followed by my division diverges from the Marksville and simsport road at Mansura. We retired leisurely and in perfect order along this road, and except by a body of 60 or 80 of the enemy's cavalry, who drove in on the infantry the few mounted officers who, in default of cavalry, were acting as a cavalry rear guard, our march was uninterrupted.

The enemy, on reaching the intersection of the road on which he was marching and that by which we were retiring, moved straight on to Fort De Russy without halting, his long column well closed up and leaving no stragglers behind. Moving slowly and halting frequently to watch the movements of the enemy, the rear of my column did not reach Bayou Du Lac until 4 p. m.

In the mean time I had been joined by a company of the Second