probably 15,000 strong, was kept in hand directly in front of my center. This powerful plan of attack was executed almost in my presence, yet a knowledge of [it] availed but to show my utter inability to successfully meet it. The Cane River was fordable at all points, and the swamps and lagoons on the left, usually impassable, were perfectly dry. Our line of defense was 1 1\2 miles front on Cane River, the artillery (three batteries) in the center. The advance on the left flank was met by Colonel Madison with his own and the Thirty-second Regiment of Cavalry, dismounted, Colonel Woods commanding. This force met the furious attack, and steadily resisted the advance of the enemy. For two hours the fire was incessant, but slowly our men were driven, until the hill above mentioned was lost. Without delay all the troops in position on my left center were withdrawn, and, under my personal command, re-enforced the extreme left. The movement had but barely been made when the enemy advanced. They were met by the fire of a section of McMahan's battery, under the gallant Lieutenant Fontaine, at close range, with double canister and the concentrated fire of 1,200 rifles. The effect was crushing and the repulse decided. Information was then received that Captain Lane, with Debray's regiment, was stubbornly but vainly contesting the advance on the extreme right. The critical moment had come; the position turned on both flanks, and a large force close in front ready to spring on the center. Availing myself of the momentary advantage gained on the left, I determined to abandon the position, the necessary orders for which had but been given, when the artillery, masked opposite my center, opened a fire which at once demonstrated that the position was no longer tenable. The command retreated in good order at a walk. The loss, about 50 men and 1 artillery wagon, the horses of which were killed, while the enemy lost full 400 killed and wounded.

That I was not successful was because success was impossible. An army of 25,000, marching at their leisure on the main road at Alexandria, could not be long impeded by a force of 2,000 horse in position on a river fordable and easy of access and approach. There was no time to prepare for the advance of Banks' army. It had been left quiet in its entrenchments 40 miles back but two days before; without warning (for it was impossible to warn me) the whole of it was suddenly thrown on me. Those who, distant from the scene, imagined that the enemy, demolished and disorganized, were fleeing before our triumphant forces might have expected other results; but those who saw that splendid army spread over the valley of the Cane River as far as the eye could reach were not surprised that the road had to be yielded to them. The position was held for seven hours' continuous fire by 2,000 men against 25,000, and yielded at last with honor. The command comprised Bee's division and Major's division of cavalry, including Bagby's and Debray's brigades.

The command fell back to Beasley's, where our supply camp had been established. There were no supplies anywhere else, as the country had been passed and repassed by both armies. These considerations warranted me in the movement, intending to be back on the main road to Alexandria in time to annoy the trains of the enemy. The distance, represented at 18 miles, proved to be 22, and the camp had been moved 6 miles farther back for greater safety, thus making the march 28 miles, exhausting the troops and frustrating my plans. On the 25th April, occupied McNutt's Hill early in the morning, but too late for useful service. On this day Major General John