massed his troops in close column behind a timbered swamp, about 1,200 yards in front of the ferry, then sent forward detachments to feel the different approaches. At 10 o'clock a large force crossed Cane River 2 miles above the ferry and moved down on my left, and another column passed down the river to a ford 4 miles below. The remainder of his army, full 15,000 men, were kept in hand directly in front of my center. This deliberate and powerful plan of attack was executed almost in my presence, yet a knowledge of it availed but to show my utter inability to successfully meet it. My line of defense was 1 1\2 miles long, covering the approaches in front to the ferry, the artillery (three batteries) being in the center. A gallant and tried band of heroes, under the intrepid Colonel Madison, afterward re-enforced by the splendid Thirty-second Regiment, with its brave colonel (Woods) at its head, met the furious attack of not less than 10,000 of the enemy on the extreme left, and for two hours steadily held their ground, during all of which time the fire of musketry was incessant and terrible, yet slowly but steadily our men were driven until the hill above descried was lost. Without a moment's delay all the troops in position on my left center were withdrawn and re-enforced the command at the extreme left. Hardly had the movement been effected when the enemy advanced. They were met by the fire of a section of McMahan's battery under the gallant Lieutenant Fontaine, at close range, with double-scotted charges of grape and canister and the concentrated fire of 1,200 rifles. The effect was crushing and the repulse decided. Information was then received that the veteran Captain Lane, of Debray's regiment, was stubbornly but vainly contesting the crossing of Cane River at the ford below, on the extreme right. The critical moment had come; the position had been turned on both flanks, and an immense army was close in front ready to spring on its center. Availing myself of the momentary advantage gained on the left by the repulse of the enemy, with the full concurrence of Brigadier-Generals Bagby and Major, commanding on the field, I determined to abandon the position, the necessary orders for which had but just been given when forty pieces of artillery, which were masked in the timber opposite the center, opened a fire which at once demonstrated that the position was not tenable. It was a torrent of fire which will not be forgotten by those who were exposed to it. The command returned in good order, "on a walk," having lost about 50 men and 1 artillery wagon, the horses of which were all killed, while the enemy admit a loss of 600 killed and wounded.

That I was not successful was because success was impossible. An army of 25,000 men, marching at their leisure on the main road to Alexandria, could not long be impeded by a small force of cavalry in position on a river fordable and easy of access at all points except at the ferry. I was unprepared for the advance of Banks' army. It had been left quiet in its entrenchments 40 miles back but two days before; without warning (for it was impossible to warn me) the whole of it was suddenly hurled on me. Those who, distant from the scene, imagined that the enemy, demoralized, disorganized, and terror stricken, were fleeing before our triumphant forces might have expected other results; but those who saw that magnificent army spread over the valley of Cane River as far back as the eye could reach, marching it solid columns with the compactness of self-reliance and conscious strength, were not surprised that the road had to be yielded to them. I was aware that "success was the criterion