the Twenty-ninth Iowa 1, under the immediate direction of General Rice. A number of prisoners were captured, officers and privates, all of whom concurred in saying that Kirby Smith and Price were both present, and that they had nine brigades of infantry. Smith did not know that we had evacuated Camden until noon next day, when he immediately gave orders for the pursuit. His troops were crossed on a raft constructed of logs with planks nailed across them, at the very spot where out pontoon bridge lay. The artillery was crossed in a flat-boat. They marched without baggage, with five day's rations in haversacks, and expected to capture a man except those whom I thought it necessary should be left on the battle-field. This necessity I regretted, but thought it of more vital importance to secure the safe passage of my command across the Saline than to attempt to bring off wounded men for whom I did not have proper transportation. More were brought off than we could have carried away had they been as severely wounded as those who were left behind. Some of our troops pursued the retreating rebels a mile, and even over the whole field. They say the enemy's loss was five to one compared with ours. I cannot now give a correct estimate of the loss on either side, but will endeavor to do so in my detailed report. The number of our troops engaged did not exceed 4,000. I have no means of estimating that of the enemy, but it was at least three times this number, with artillery. All our artillery had been sent across the river early in the day except one section, and even that was withdrawn to get it out of the mud. At the time the enemy was routed, all of our trains and artillery had just completed the passage of the river.

The enemy having disappeared from the field our troops were withdrawn and passed over the brigade, without interruption from the enemy. The bridge was kept two hours to pass over our wounded men and stragglers. It was nearly worn out (India-rubber floats), having been in use over two years; some parts of it were 2 feet under water and I ordered it to be destroyed. We had no transportation for it, the mules were exhausted, the wagons were destroyed. It had done good service; without it my whole command would in all probability have been lost. General Halleck sent it to me two years ago last March, to operate on Current and Blank rivers. One surgeon and two assistant surgeons, with sufficient number of hospital attendants, were left to attend the wounded. Hospital supplies were also left. The rebels did not attempt to follow us. The rain continued until late in the evening and the road toward Little Rock had become almost impassable for trains and artillery. I ordered the worst of the wagons and the least valuable baggage to be destroyed, and the best teams to be put to the artillery and the remaining wagons. The ambulances and wagons carrying the sick and wounded and all the route to the Arkansas and the one least liable to interruption from the enemy. The command and the train were started toward Little Rock, in order to frustrate the designs which the enemy was supposed to have on that place. Owing to the state of the roads, for the first 5 miles progress was very slow, and it became necessary to destroy a few more wagons which could not be god along. We moved on as rapidly as possible and reached this place on the 2nd instant, without having seen the enemy after they retired from the battle-field near Jenkins' Ferry. It was reported, however, that Fagan crossed some artillery and part of his troops at Benton for