On the evening of the 14th, our scouting parties form the front discovered the enemy in force. They had evidently made a forced march from Washington by what is called the middle road, to get in our front to detain us, while Price, moving by the lower or main stage road, hoped to reach Camden before us. General Steele ordered the start at 4 a. m. the next day, and although the enemy made a gallant resistance, at a point 14 miles from Camden, he was quickly driven from his position and followed up so closely that no line was formed between that point and Camden, the advance marching in and taking possession of the city and works before dark, having marched 21 miles and fought quite a battle on that day, the 15th. Under orders from General Steele, I laid the pontoon bridge across the Washita River at a point opposite the town connecting with the road to Pine Bluff. At this place the length of the brigade was 265 feet. The rest of the time that I was in Camden was devoted to a careful reconnaissance of our whole front. A tracing of the map* of the town of Camden, with the position of the forts, made under my direction by Lieutenant F. Sommer, Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, who acted as assistant engineer on this campaign, accompanies this reported.

We had received rumors that General Banks had met with a several repulse on Red River. This was confirmed by the arrival of an aide-de-camp of that general, who acknowledged the defeat and brought a request that General Steele would move immediately forward and join him on Red River. To suppose that a force of about 12,000 men, without supplies, ammunition scant, could move over a country nearly barren of forage and exhausted of supplies, in the face of an active and exultant enemy, under the command of one of the most energetic and skillful of the rebel generals, and then to cross a river like the Red to make junction with General Banks' forces, leaving all this country open, was so absurd that General Steele did not entertain it for one moment. The results of the past few days prove the accuracy of General Steele's judgment.

The command had marched the whole distance on half rations of hard bread, quarter rations of bacon, and full rations of coffee and salt, relying on the country for the filling out of the ration, and of this short allowance we had very little left. The country was foraged around for corn to supply the place of bread and forage for our suffering animals. It was on one of these foraging expeditions for corn that we lost the train captured by the enemy on the 18th.

On the 20th, we received a supply train of ten days' rations, in the same proportion as before mentioned. This train was immediately sent back for a fresh supply, leaving Camden on the 23rd, protected by an entire brigade of infantry, four pieces of artillery, and a proper proportion of cavalry. On the evening of the 25th, we heard of its captured. Scouting parties had gone up and down the east bank of the Washita for 30 miles before it started, and no evidence of the enemy was seen. We have since learned that they made a forced march of 48 miles on the 24th and 8 miles on the morning of the 25th, having crossed the Washita nearly 50 miles below Camden. This event showed the precarious nature of our supplies.

Our scouting parties in the front had succeeded in capturing prisoners who claimed to belong to infantry divisions of the enemy. Our spies, deserters coming into our lines, and stories told us by the

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*Not found.

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