occupied by our troops for the purpose of gaining information and ascertaining the number and condition of the troops that could be made available. General Steele was instructed to report his condition and prospects, to hold the line of the Arkansas, to concentrate his forces as much as possible, and to abandon all points that are not of vital importance. General Washburn was charged with the duty of keeping open General Steele's communications by the way of White River and the railroad from Devall's Bluff to Little Rock. Instructions were also given to hold all the troops on the river that could be spared in readiness for immediate movement. On my arrival at the mouth of Red River I found General Banks' communications by that river still interrupted, and arrangements were at once made to collect a force sufficient to re-establish them. The success of the dam at Alexandria in releasing the gun-boats rendered this unnecessary, and the troops ordered from points above and below were sent or ordered back.

General Banks marched from Alexandria on the 14th and reached Simsport on the 17th, encountering and driving the enemy (about 15,000 strong) on his way down. After a conference with General Banks and arranging the disposition to be made of his troops, the detachments of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps were relieved and ordered to report to me, and I designed leaving for the mouth of White River, but learning that the crossing of the Atchafalaya was attended with greater difficulties than had been anticipated, and that the enemy in considerable force was threatening the rear of the army, I returned to Simsport and remained there until the crossing of the army was successfully accomplished. The Nineteenth Army Corps has been established at Morganza, for the purpose of covering the approaches from the direction of Red River and Opelousas, and as the most suitable for assembling the troops designated for service west of the Mississippi. The command of Major General A. J. Smith has been sent to Vicksburg, for the purpose of being employed in Arkansas (which I still consider the point of greatest danger) if necessary.

The troops of the Red River expedition from the Department of the Gulf, although in better state than I had supposed, are not in a condition to take the field, and it will require thirty days to reorganize, equip, and refit them. I am not yet advised of the condition of Major-General Steele's troops, but it will take some time to replace the losses of material. Those of General Smith are in good condition, except as to supplies. It will take ten days to equip them, but they may be used at once, if necessary. The failure of the Red River expedition was fixed when that army returned to Grand Ecore. Whether it could have been successfully prosecuted after the battle of April 9 is questionable. In my judgment it could not have been, and the return of the army from Alexandria after the safety of the gun-boats had been secured was necessary. No new expedition by the line of the Red River should be undertaken. Its navigation has always been treacherous and unreliable, and even when good the character of its banks is such that gun-boats can be but of little service in keeping it open. It would require a force equal to the operating army to keep open its communications.

Any combinations having this river as one of its elements will, in six cases out of ten, result in disaster. The Washita is a better route, but liable to many of the same objections. Shreveport can be reached by land from several points on the Mississippi, by a shorter