enemy last summer during the latter part of the siege of Port Hudson. From my present information I am of the opinion that the best line of occupation for our forces west of the Mississippi River is the line from Plaquemine to Brashear City, following the lower Grand River. It will be seen from the maps that the only points at which a large force can cross this line are, first, in the vicinity of Plaquemine and Indian Village, and, second, at Brashear City. The country between these points and to the west of Grand Bayou is intersected by numerous bayou and swamps, and is destitute of routes by which an army can move. Small bodies of men, however, can penetrate the region in boats, and guerrilla operations can be extensively carried on, as well as smuggling, to a great extent; and I am credibly informed that these operations have been extensively carried on.

The occupation of the line would require, then, first, the occupation of Plaquemine and Indian Village by a force which should cover the line from the Mississippi to the mouth of Grand River, a distance of about 8 miles; second, the occupation of Brashear City; third, a reserve on the La Fourche, with headquarters at Napoleonville and outposts on all the roads leading west as far as Grand Bayou; fourth, a cavalry force to patrol the line of Grand Bayou and to scout on all the approaches to the line above indicated. All these forces should constitute a single command. I believe that this disposition of forces would be the most economical that can be adopted, unless the entire territory west of the Mississippi is abandoned. By this plan the entire triangle bounded by the Mississippi, Gulf of Mexico, and the line from Plaquemine to the mouth of the Atchafalaya will be kept free from rebel raids; protection will be continued to the inhabitants of the country, and the city of New Orleans be kept free from all excitement produced by the near approach of rebel forces.

The presence of gun-boats at Berwick Bay will materially assist in the defense of that position, which can only be taken by a force crossing in boats and investing the place by the rear. The position at Indian Village and points in that vicinity at which the bayou can be crossed can be fortified. I would estimate the forces necessary to hold this line at 12,000 troops, white and black; 1,500 should be cavalry. The infantry and artillery should be posted as follows: Four thousand five hundred at Plaquemine, Indian Village, and vicinity; 5,500 on the La Fourche and picketing all the routes leading in from the west; 2,000 at Brashear City and on the railroad west of La Fourche Bayou. Each of these forces should have selected a defensive point on the Mississippi to which they could retire in case of necessity, those at Indian Village to Plaquemine or Bayou Goula; those on the La Fourche can best reach the river at Donaldsonville. There is also a road leading direct from Thibodeaux to the Mississippi; this latter road requires repairs. With this disposition of forces and with proper watchfulness, there will always be time to withdraw the force at Brashear City, should this become advisable. As to the approaches from the east, I consider that, in addition to the garrisons at Baton Rouge and Port Hudson, and the garrisons of the permanent posts, a force of 6,000 men will be sufficient for the defense of New Orleans, the only approaches being by Pass Manchac and Bonnet Carre. Any large force approaching New Orleans from the east must eventually encounter our defensive line at Camp Parapet, which can easily be held by the force mentioned,