so that out of an aggregate of 11,000 troops not men enough are left under the orders of the division commander for a headquarters guard. And being aware that verbal requests of this nature have heretofore been without effect, I fell called upon to accompany the application with the following remarks: General Orders, Numbers 4, dated headquarters Division of West Mississippi, Natchez, Miss., May 23, 1864, provide that-

Commanders of departments and districts, after providing adequately for the security of the posts it is necessary to hold, are charge with the duty of organizing as large a reserve force for service in the field as possible. The troops to be employed on this duty will be selected from those that from organization and discipline will be the most effective, and will be organized and equipped with as little delay as possible.

The inference from this is that the troops selected for service in the field will be those that are the best organized and disciplined (which is perfectly reasonable), and that a character for superiority will, as a consequence, be attached to them. It is also highly probable that troops that are already stationed at detached posts and that remain will, by the five of circumstances if nothing else, be required to continue at such posts and not participate in the proposed "service in the field." A movement will likely be at short notice, and there will be little opportunity then to relive troops at remove stations. These considerations, therefore, are conclusive in favor to this application, if it is proposed to include any of this division in the "reserve force for service in the field." Further than this, I will base my application on the ground of simple justice.

The Second Division, after hard service and great exposure in the Yazoo Valley, during the siege of Vicksburg, many of the regiments veterans already from Fort Donelson and Shiloh, came up to Arkansas and participated in the expedition which led to the capture of Little Rock. Its previous services entitled it to some consideration. But the most of it was very soon detached, and it has been kept detached at different posts, as many as six, ever since. All this time, only one regiment of the Third (now the First) Division has been detached. The consequence has been that the Second Division has not had its just and fair opportunities from organization, instruction, and discipline. When, therefore, inspectors and important military personages have visited the army, the Second Division has not been able to do justice to itself nor to its commander. So uniformly to keep this division detached, and so studiously to preserve the First Division together and intact, gives rise to the belief that this division does not stand with he commander of the department in good favor.

The fact that when the Third (now the First) Division lost a brigade in the late campaign, one of the best brigades was taken from this division to supply its place, is an indication that this division is to be subordinate and secondary to that division, and that the First Division is to prosper at the expense of this. To have troops most efficient, they should be together some period of time in order to acquire an interest and pride in their organization. The good of the service, as well as justice, requires, therefore, that as many troops should be detached from one division as from another. In detaching troops from the Second Division, the rule has not been followed of keeping even a brigade together, but brigades have been widely detached. I will cheerfully submit to all the inconveniences which the exigencies of the service and the natural and reasonable course of