HDQRS. CONFEDERATE FORCES IN NORTH. ARKANSAS,
June 27, 1864.

Colonel McCRAY,

Commanding Brigade:

COLONEL: Since my engagement with the gun-boats the Federals landed a heavy force, and have followed with cavalry, infantry and artillery. I fought them all day yesterday and all day to-day. They still follow slowly. Have your entire command in readiness to move with the ordnance train up Blact River on the east side. Keep everything quiet. If I cannot cross Cache I shall keep up on this side toward Pacahontas. I shall cross Bayou De View either at Jonhson's Brigade or Couch's Ferry.

Very respectfully,

JO. O. SHELBY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

MERIDIAN, MISS., June 28, 1864.

General E. KIRBY SMITH

(On any general officer commanding C. S. forces west Mississippi River, via Clinton, La.):

The enemy have concentrated a force at Vicksburg from above and below: also at Memphis for movement in this department. By direction of General Bragg I ask your co-operation without delay in any available way or on any point practicable to divert this force and complied its return. Not knowing your locality, can make no suggestions as to plans.

S. D. LEE,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF INDIAN TERRITORY,
In Camp, June 28, 1864.

Brigadier General D. H. COOPER:

GENERAL: I am just in receipt of your letter, Numbers 500, or this date. In regard to the fall of Fort Smith necessitating the fall of Fort Gibson, as expressed, it is denied, thus: An attack made by us on Fort Smith, if successful, would leave Fort Gibson beyou the reach of re-enforcements, and the garrison at Fort Gibson being much less than that at Fort Smith, and composed exclusively of Indians of home guards, who would not so readily as whites evacuate and abandon their country, could be easily taken by the same force that captured Fort Smith, after leaving a garrison to hold that place, or starved out by cutting off supplies. I readily perceive the importance of Fort Gibson as the depot of supplies for both forts in time of low water, which I endeavored to point pout in my communication of yesterday. In regard to holding Fort Gibson as a base from which to operate on the line of communication to Fort Smith, an by cutting off supplies from the latter compel its evacuation, you are doubles right, provided we can hold this advanced position (Fort Gibson) and preserve our line of communication with our supplies, which must (breadstuffs, at least), as well as ammunition, &c.,

be drawn from Texas. Besides, would not this be such a departure from present orders as would not be justified?