By the COURT:

Question. You stated that General Burnside's order directed that your division should bear to the left, and take up a position on the Jerusalem plank road. What was the cause of the failure to execute this maneuver?

Answer. The First Division was to move on Cemetery Hill. I would state that Cemetery Hill bore rather to the right of my front, so that it was necessary that Cemetery Hill should be occupied before any ground beyond it could be occupied. In pursuance of my original expectation, I had given orders that the leading regiment should turn down to the left in the line of works, and the Twenty-seventh Michigan started down that line. As soon as General Burnside perceived that the First Division was not moving forward, he sent me orders to move forward my division direct upon Cemetery Hill. My idea was to carry out the spirit of what was understood the day before, and my plan was to throw the whole division on the left into line, so that the right would rest on the Jerusalem plank road; and that would have completely protected the flank of the First Division. This movement was begun, but the commanding officer of the Twenty-seventh Michigan was shot, and the way the First Division moved forward by division created more or less confusion; and by the time I received the order to advance on Cemetery Hill, of before that, in fact, the enemy had concentrated such a fire that we could not advance any farther.

TESTIMONY OF Brigadier General S. G. GRIFFIN.

Brigadier General S. G. GRIFFIN, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault. My command was the Second Brigade, Second Division (General Potter's), Ninth Army Corps.

Question. Did you regard that assault as a failure?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think I should, because we did not hold the ground.

Question. State some of the causes that you attribute this to.

Answer. In the first place I should say that the troops in the front did not advance exactly as they should, nor as far as they should. Probably the best ground was not selected. Then the cause of our not holding the ground was the piling in of so many troops in certain parts of the ground where there was no room for them, and a panic having seized those troops caused the disaster. The enemy concentrated all their fire upon that point as soon as we attacked, which was another great reason, no doubt. We received their fire at that point from all directions, and very soon after we first arrived there it was a very sharp fire.

Question. Why were all the troops directed to that point?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Do you think that arrangement was faulty?

Answer. The execution of the plan seemed to be faulty.

Question. Were any arrangements made for passing the troops through the abatis of our line and over the parapet in front of the enemy's?

Answer. For my part, in my brigade I had a pioneer corps, and skirmishers to clear the way for them.

Question. Did you command go beyond the crater?

Answer. It did.

Question. About how far?

Answer. I should judge 200 yards; it might be more or it might be less; it could not have been much less, however; that is as near as I can judge.