Answer. I went up with my brigade,and while we were there I was most of the time in the crater, or near it, with my troops all the time.

Question. What was the forces that came out to attack you-the force that was exposed in the open?

Answer. Five hundred or 600 men were all that we could see. I did not see either the right or left of the line. I was the center of the line as it appeared to me. It was a good of battle. Probably if we had not been under orders to evacuate we should have fought them and tried to hold our position; but according to the orders we withdrew.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL HARTRANFT.

Brigadier General J. F. HARTRANFT, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Questions. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was there. My command was the First Brigade of the Third Division (General Willcox's) of the Ninth Corps.

Question. Did you regard the attack as a failure?

Answer. I did.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the cause of that failure?

Answer. The massing of the troops in the crater where they could not be used with any effect. I think that the troops, instead of being sent to the crater, should have been sent to the right and left, so as to have moved in line of battle, then they could have advanced in some kind of shape; but after they came into the crater in the confusion they were in, other troops being brought up only increased the confusion, and by the time the enfilading fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry had become very annoying, which also made it very difficult to rally and from the troops.

Question. Do you know any reasons why the troops did not go to the right and left of the crater? Were there any physical obstacles to prevent them?

Answer. No; I think troops could have been sent there. The Second Brigade of my division was sent to the left of the crater; they took a portion of the pits. If a vigorous attack had been made on the right and left of the crater I think the enemy's pits could have been taken without any difficulty and the line occupied.

Question. What was the formation of your command in moving forward?

Answer. I formed my command, which was immediately in rear of the First Division (which was the assaulting division), in one or two regiments front - I put two small regiments together - an my instructions were, after I passed through the crater with my advance, to form to the left of the First Division, protecting its left flank while they were advancing, and form my line as the regiments would come up, so as to from a line of battle on the left of the First Division.

Question. If the troops that first went into the crater had not delayed there, could they not, considering the consternation that the explosion of the mine made in the enemy's camp, have got forward to the crest of Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I think they could have moved up to that crest immediately, if they had made no halt at all, under the consternation of the enemy. I think they would have had to re-enforce them speedily in order to hold that hill.

Question. The re-enforcements were there, were they not?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And there was nothing to prevent that result?

Answer. No, sir. I have thought sometimes that it would have been difficult to have sent troops the crater in sufficient force to sustain the First Division in