IV. Colonel Z. R. Bliss, Seventh Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second division, Ninth Corps. In this, that he remained behind with the only regiment of his brigade which did not go forward according to the orders and occupied a position where he could not properly command a brigade which formed a portion of an assaulting column, and where he could not see what was going on.

V. Brigadier General O. B. Willcox, U. S. Volunteers.

The Court is not satisfied that General Willcox's division made efforts commensurate with the occasion to carry out General Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery Hill, and they think that more energy might have been exercised by Brigadier-General Willcox to cause his troops to go forward to that point.

Without intending to convey the impression that there was any disinclination on the part of the commanders of the supports to heartily co-operate in the attack on the 30th of July, the Court express their opinion that explicit orders should have been given assigning one officer to the command of all the troops intended to engaged in the assault when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations.

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, President of Court.

ED. SCHRIVER,

Inspector-General U. S. Army, Judge-Advocate.

The court then adjourned sine die.

WINF'S S. HANCOCK,

Major-General U. S. Volunteers, President of Court.

ED. SCHRIVER,

Inspector-General U. S. Army, Judge-Advocate.

APPENDIX.

A.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
City Point, Va., July 24, 1864.

Major General G. G. MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances, they think, will be better on Burnside's front. It this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's lines we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed of the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly should they not succeed in breaking through. To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Thin lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flank of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice, either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders: If they see the enemy giving way in their front, or moving from it to re-enforce a

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