the enemy's resistance this information to be correct, I determined to hold the position with my own division till the balance of the command with the train could move by the left flank through the country to the road leading to Ream's Station. I hoped to march entirely around the cavalry at Stony Creek, and reach the left of our infantry before Hampton could discover my intention. I therefore directed Chapman to support McIntosh, while Kautz should conduct the column in its new march. In the mean time the enemy, finding that my troops had ceased to advance, made his dispositions and attacked them with great fury, but were repulsed with heavy loss. It was then some time after dark. Fitzhugh's battery was run to the front on the left of our line and posted by Colonel McIntosh so as to sweep with direct cross-fire all the ground. Maynadier's battery was posted near the road. Sharp skirmishing continued throughout the night; the enemy attacked three times with spirit, but were met with determination equal to their own and each time repulsed with loss. By dawn everything had been withdrawn, except a part of Chapman's brigade. The enemy, discovering the state of affairs, pushed in on Chapman's left flank and broke through. Colonel Chapman gathered his command and marching rapidly on a large circuit rejoined the column near Reams' Station.

At 7 a.m. June 29 General Kautz's advance arrived in the neighborhood of that place, but instead of finding it int the possession of the infantry of the Army of the Potomac found Hoke's division of rebel infantry strongly posted. He attacked them at once but after capturing about 60 prisoners was compelled to withdraw his troops. By 9 a.m. the entire command was untied. Having remained with McIntosh throughout the night I did not arrive until about 8 a.m. I had previously sent Captain Whitaker, of my staff, forward with instructions to make his way with the utmost rapidity to General Meade's headquarters. After examining the ground and getting all the information I could from citizens in regard to the enemy's position, I determined to mass the entire command on the road leading to Petersburg - artillery behind the cavalry, ambulance next to the artillery, ammunition wagons last - and make a bold push to break through the enemy; having done this, to cross the railroad three miles north of Reams' Station and join the left of the army. But before the necessary dispositions could be made the enemy covered this road also with a strong force infantry. The scouts soon after reported a heavy body of cavalry moving around our left flank. In company with Colonel McIntosh I carefully reconnoitered the enemy's line, but after examining it closely could see not reasonable hope of breaking through it our turning it. I therefore directed the troops to take all the ammunition required, and after leaving the ambulances and setting fire to the train, withdraw from their position by the Boydton road to the Double Bridges on the Nottoway - unless in the meantime something should be done by General Meade to relieve us. In confidently hoped that either the firing of our artillery or the message of Captain Whitaker would bring troops to our assistance. It was evident from the deliberate movements of the rebel infantry that they fully expected to capture my command. The situation was critical. Hampton with two divisions of cavalry at Stony Creek Depot, Hoke's division of infantry at Reams' Station, on our right flank, connecting with another large force formed in two lines of battle in our front, and W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry marching around our left flank, were clear enough indications of the rebel intentions. It was plain nothing but great celerity of motion could extricate the command. I therefore clearly indicated the route