HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
City Point, Va., June 16, 1864-8.35 p.m.

Major-General MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: No part of the Fifth Corps has yet arrived. General Butler has not reported the withdrawal of his troops from their advanced position. It was not my intention to take Wright from you for any longer time than the emergency lasted. I think, now, he had better go to Bermuda Hundred for to-night, under any circumstances. It gives him but a short march, his steamers landing up the Appomattox near to where he is wanted, and to-morrow, if all is quiet, he will be near where Smith is, and the change can be made.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

JUNE 16, 1864-10.30 p.m.

[Major-General MEADE:]

The result of your operations of this evening not yet being fully determined, and not knowing appearances in front of you, I cannot give positive directions how far or how hard you should push in the morning. I will leave this to your judgment, knowing that you will push any advantage that may be gained to-night. If you do not require Smith further than to hold his present line you may direct him to move all the troops he has, except enough for that, to Bermuda Hundred, in the morning, and as soon as the other division of Wright's corps arrives put it in Smith's place, and order his remaining division up to join him. I have no further news from Butler, but have sent for information. I understand, however, that besides the railroad destroyed, the troops leveled much of the enemy's line fronting us. I had previously asked the question if they could not be turned to face the other way so that we might occupy them. I will go out in the morning to see you, after hearing from General Butler.

U. S. GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL HANCOCK, June 16, 1864-3.45 p.m.

[Major-General MEADE:]

GENERAL: I have no means of judging of the force the enemy has to resist an assault. He does not show himself. I have heard of no other visible collection of troops than the march of about a brigade and a battery in front of Barlow. Our view extends only to two or three of his works beyond Barlow. These are partially enfiladed from Barlow's right. I should think the chances in favor of carrying these works by opening a heavy artillery fire from Barlow's front, then advancing that front, supported by Burnside, holding a part of Burnside in reserve to protect our left from any flank movement. Kautz's cavalry should demonstrate to our left.

J. G. BARNARD.