A strong picket consisting of about one-half my command was thrown out immediately after sunset, and the remainder of the division occupied the line extending across the rear of Battery Harrison until about 9 p.m., when I was relieved by the Third Division (colored troops), commanded by Brigadier-General Paine, and, under orders from Brigadier-General Heckman, commanding corps (Major-General Ord having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of a severe wound), I took a new position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison and outside that work, and my left refused. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to dislodge me from this position, and at about 8 a.m. of the 30th I was directed to resume my former position inside the battery, relieving in turn Brigadier-General Paine, of the Third Division. Nothing of importance occurred during the forenoon. The enemy were evidently heavily re-enforced and appeared to be maneuvering for a favorable position from which to make an assault. The enemy's gun-boats continued to shell our position from guns throwing 9-inch shell, with, however, but slight damage, when, at about midday, I re[per]ceived the enemy's preparations for an assault on my right, I hastily moved the larger portion of my First Brigade from the left to the extreme right of my position, which was my weakest point.

During the night previous the Third Division had made good progress in strengthening the position. A strong rifle-pit, with log traverses, had been thrown up on the left and along the center, but the right had no such protection. My command from the time that they entered the work in the morning had been busily engaged in strengthening make Battery Harrison an inclosed work. Before this portion of the line could be completed the enemy, at about 12.30 o'clock noon, threw himself in three lines upon my right, at the same time opening with two full batteries of field guns upon my center the left. I reserved my fire until they had emerged front he chaparral through which they advanced, when I opened a most effective fire of musketry. At the same time I replied to his artillery with the half battery mentioned in report of operations for the 29th, but with small effect. This battery had, under direction of the chief of artillery, been placed under a different commander from that of the previous day, and the officer now in command reported to me almost immediately after the action commenced that he was out of ammunition. Such carelessness on the part of a commissioned officer is extremely reprehensible, and I regret that circumstances which occurred an hour later have rendered it impossible for me to report the designation of the battery or the name of the officer. I directed that the guns should be withdrawn by hand, it being impossible to bring horses into the work, and sent a staff officer to corps headquarters for a full battery and a capable officer. Brevet Major-General Weitzel, who had now assumed command of the corps, promised me every assistance. The enemy's furious onset had been in the meantime repulsed with musketry alone, driving him to cover, and leaving an immense number of dead and wounded in front of my right. He, however, quickly reformed, and with his accustomed yell tried the same position a second time. Finding that my ammunition was getting low, I had a few moments before sent a staff officer with an order to bring up a wagon from my ordnance train. The wagon came just at the right time, during the second assault, and was driven up to the sally-port of the fort by Captain John Brydon, One hundred and eighteenth New York Volunteers, and acting ordnance officer of the divis-