battalion held a hill in rear of Breckinridge's line, fronting to the left, and Breathed's guns, of the Horse Artillery, were operating with good effect from point as occasion offered. Late in the day the right was still steady, but the left was becoming more and critical. The enemy's cavalry in driving back Fitzhugh Lee's small force dashed through the infantry brigade sent to his support and captured many of its men. Our left still receding, the center became more and more salient, and had also to be gradually drawn back. The retrograde movement was, of course, each time more difficult and the infantry was becoming unmanageable.

Fortunately (says Colonel Carter), the artillery was under perfect control to the last, and maneuvered and fought with untiring courage. The guns retired from point to point, halting, unlimbering, and firing, while efforts were made by general officers to rally the infantry.

Near the close of the day Colonel Carter received a painful wound from a fragment of shell, which compelled him to turn over the command of the artillery to Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson. Happily, it did not permanently disable him. For a fuller account of the battle I refer to Colonel Carter's intelligent and interesting report. It is, however, just that one or two more of his important statements be here quoted:

The whole army (he adds) will testify to the stout resistance made by the artillery in this long and exhausting struggle. * * * It may be safely said that had the other arms of service done their duty as faithfully as did the artillery the army might have rested afterward on the Potomac. * * * Our loss of the day was mainly due to the enemy's immense excess in cavalry. This, by enveloping our left, forced it steadily back and ultimately compelled the abandonment of the field. For a strictly defensive battle as this soon became I had not artillery enough. Another artillery battalion to have held the Martinsburg turnpike and the heights northwest of Winchester would have prevented the fatal progress of the enemy's cavalry.

Three guns were lost on this occasion-two lent by Lieutenant-Colonel King to the cavalry, and another from the same battalion late in the evening on the retreat. Cutshaw's battalion was all the time absent with Kershaw's division on an expedition resisting a force of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge in Fauquier and Culpeper Counties.

After this serious reverse of September 19 the army retired during the night, and reaching Fisher's Hill, beyond Strasburg, formed line of battle early on the 20th, King's guns on the right, Braxton's next and Nelson's still farther to the left. Owing to some misapprehension or oversight certain precautions recommended by the acting chief of artillery in adjusting the line on the left, where the enemy's movements indicated his chief attack was to be made, were neglected and the result proved again disastrous.

On the evening of the 22nd the enemy made a dash upon our extreme left, occupied by General Lomax's cavalry. It soon gave way, and the enemy swept down the line, capturing 4 of Nelson's 2 guns, from Lomax's Horse Artillery, 7 of Braxton's and 1 of King's-14 in all. Yet the artillery was not in fault. Colonel Nelson affirms that they did their duty fully and efficiently, as testified by all officers and men who had opportunity to observe. All was brought off which could possibly be secured, and while retiring halted, unlimbered and checked the enemy from point to point, that the trains might be gotten safely to the rear.

The army still moved back on the 24th beyond New Market retiring in line of battle, and portions of each artillery battalion from time to time taking position and operating effectually in keeping the enemy in check. While assisting in keeping the enemy at bay, about seven