have taken. We, therefore, are waiting further developments and securing our position. I would be pleased to know if our course meets the approval of the general commanding.

Respectfully,

G. K. WARREN,

Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 1, 1864-2 p. m.

Major-General WARREN, Commanding Fifth Corps:

Your dispatch of 11.30 a. m. received. Your course, as preliminary to the arrival of Mott's division, is approved by the commanding general. As soon as Mott gets up dispositions must be made to attack.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

YELLOW TAVERN, October 1, 1864-7 p. m.

Major-General WARREN, Commanding Fifth Corps:

The major-general commanding directs that you move forward and attack to-morrow, as soon after daylight as practicable, in conjunction with General Parke, who has similar orders. You will use your whole force in attacking, except that part in the inclosed works of the regular line of intrenchments. General Parke will show you his instructions, which will acquaint you with the views of the major-general commanding.*

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, October 1, 1864-evening.

Major-General MEADE:

GENERAL: From what I know of our and General Lee's relative strength I do not think we can extend our lines further around Petersburg without great risk. If we design, by such continued extensions, ultimately to make him abandon Petersburg, and if the complete envelopment of it from river-bank to river-back is practicable, I think it altogether to be expected that when we reach our fullest development he will, by a concentrated effort, break our lines and compel us to fall back to the James with much loss of material. If Petersburg is worth the efforts we are making, it is worth that effort from General Lee, and he will make it before evacuation of the place. Now, I would propose the establishment of a very strong position on the Weldon railroad, with a supply of stores and competent garrison, and then, assembling all our force, place ourselves on the South Side Railroad and destroy it. This would undoubtedly bring on a general battle, which would decide whether General Lee could keep the field against us or not. If he could not, we should thus compel him to retire within his defenses, and a siege proper could begin. If he beats us, we can retire upon the position on the Weldon railroad or upon the James. This last is a supposition which our calculations do not admit of. If it be said General Lee might refuse us battle and come out between us and our base and fortify, we

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*See Humphreys to Parke, 6.45 p. m., p. 26.

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