HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,
October 21, 1864.

Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward the following report of casualties occurring in this command during the ten days ending the 20th instant:

Killed. Wounded.

Command. Officers. Men. Officers. Men.

Corps headquarters ...... ....... ....... ......

Engineer Battalion ...... ....... ....... ......

Artillery Brigade ...... ....... ....... 2

First Division ...... 5 ....... 23

Second Division ...... 6 1 19

Third Division ...... 10 ...... 26

Total ...... 21 1 70

Total.

Command. Officers. Men. Aggregate.

Corps headquarters ...... ....... ......

Engineer Battalion ...... ....... ......

Artillery Brigade ...... 2 2

First Division ...... 28 28

Second Division 1 25 26

Third Division ...... 36 36

Total 1 91 92

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINF'D S. HANCOCK,

Major-General of Volunteers.

CIRCULAR.] HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, SECOND ARMY CORPS,

October 21, 1864.

Brigade commanders will state below the number of men, inclusive of recruits (but exclusive of non-commissioned officers), in their respective commands, available for fatigue and picket duty, independent of the garrison in the different forts.

By command of Brevet Major-General Mott:

J. P. FINKELMEIER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

First Brigade, 842; Second Brigade, 879; Third Brigade, 868.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,
October 21, 1864.

Captain J. P. FINKELMEIER,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that Captain Andrews, Twentieth Indiana Volunteers, and brigade officer of the day, having been directed by me to ascertain the exact condition of the enemy's rifle-pits on the right of the plank road of the place known as the Chimneys, has just brought in the following report: Since the Second Division has furnished the pickets in front of Fort Sedgwick, during the absence of our division, then engaged in active operations on the left of the army, the enemy has been allowed to build two or three pits in advance of his line on the right of the orad, so as to obtain an enfilading fire at very close range on our pits across the road, which explains the recent