HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, October 22, 1864.

Major General G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential communication of yesterday calling upon me for my views as to the practicability and expediency of holding the line now held by this corps by holding the inclosed works only the garrisons of these works furnishing the pickets as far as practicable. In reply I have to state that, in my judgment, it would not be wise nor safe to materially weaken or change the present picket-line. Until it is removed the enemy can never tell how strongly we are holding the main line, and should they drive in the picket-line the men by taking refuge in the rifle-pits connecting the inclosed works would assist much in repelling any attack. The daily detail for picket is now 1,610 men, with the proper complement of officers and non-commissioned officers. The river line from Battery No. 5 to Redoubt Converse is held by about 250 men, the remainder picketing to a point between Battery 24 and Fort Howard. I would propose, the, to allow in addition to the garrisons of all the inclosed works, a force of, say 1,625 men for picket duty, to alternate with a like number from the garrisons in doing the picketing. The tabular statement herewith inclosed shows the number of muskets and field guns required, in my opinion, to hold the line with any assurance of safety.* The character of the line is such that nothing can make it entirely safe but the establishment of good reserves at certain points. Our lines are in such close proximity to those of the enemy that our artillery, on which the strength of the line depends, has not its full power. Neither are the different points of the line in mutual support. Were the enemy to break through at Fort Morton or the Hare house nothing could prevent them from obtaining possession of the commanding ridge on which the Friend, Dunn, and Avery houses are situated, and so compel the abandonment of the whole time, even as far as the plank road. It is to be regretted that this ridge, equally strong in front and rear, was not fortified. The enemy have followed a different plan from ours. The powerful works they have erected on the crest nearest the river hold by artillery the front line and prevent us from knowing the force there. The line between Fort Hays and Fort Howard is weak, and would be fatally so without a strong picket well thrown out. The strongest part of the line is now probably on the plank road - strong because the front line is subjected to the fire of Fort Davis. With the force exhibited in the tabular statement I think the line could only be taken at a costly sacrifice on the part of the enemy. I speak of an assault on the works, for if the enemy were to cross the Appomattox below Battery No. 5 (and a picket of 235 men could not long resist them) they would place our line in imminent peril. If operations toward the South Side Railroad should drain off a large portion of the enemy's force, the number of men mentioned in the table might be reduced by 1,500 men, the garrisons supplying the entire picket detail, which I would on no account materially lessen.

I have limited my observations to the question of practicability. Personally, I should prefer some other position than the charge of such an extended line, with no reserves,when everything depends on the good conduct of subordinates. If any change of the nature indicated is determined on, two or three days ought to be allowed for its execution,

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*Statement not found.

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